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 ABSTRACT  
 
Modeling the Determinants of Industry Political Power: 
Industry Winners in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.  (May 2004) 
Amy Louise Kardell, B.A., Texas A&M University; 
M.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Alex McIntosh 
 
This study uses qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine the basis of industry 
political power by assessing conditions of economic interdependence and political action 
associated with the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), and the 
significant reduction in effective tax rates for eight of eighteen U.S. industries.  Past research has 
focused on the simple passage of “pro-business” legislation, failing to provide adequate evidence 
as to who benefits or how they benefit from the legislation.  The Boolean analysis used in this 
study indicates that a distinct combination of both political action and economic factors present a 
clear pattern of causal conditions associated with both tax winners and losers.  Using three 
separate analyses, the theoretically exclusive explanations offered by both class dominance and 
structural theories fail to provide any clear explanations.  Tax policy is associated with a set of 
conditions that are conjunctural in nature, supporting a combined model.  Strong PAC 
contributions, number of registered lobbyists, and outside lobby firms in association with a 
strong federal relationship, and either total economic strength or strong inter-industry relations 
produced the specific conjunctural patterns associated with “winning’ industries.  Lack of 
significant PAC contributions to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees 
insured an industries failure to benefit from the legislative change.  The results from this study 
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indicate that a new theoretical model is needed that incorporates the complexity of the 
interdependent-relationships of political and economic conditions.  Evolving from the mutually 
exclusive theoretical explanations of the past, class segmentation, political dominance, and 
structural economic explanations are brought back together in a manner that exposes the 
complexity of the relationships resulted in tangible benefits from the passage of ERTA.   
 
  
v  
DEDICATION 
 
In loving memory of my mother - Ramona Kardell.  Thanks for the stubborn streak. 
  
vi  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Anyone who has survived this process knows the challenges that come with it.  
Completing my doctoral program, and writing this dissertation would have been impossible were 
it not for many individuals that supported, defended, challenged, and protected me.  I am grateful 
for having the opportunity to work with such a wonderful committee:  Dr. Alex McIntosh, Dr. 
Sam Cohn, Dr. Mary Zey, and Dr. John Robertson.  My chair, Dr. Alex McIntosh is the model of 
academic dedication, integrity and compassion.  If I can positively affect as many students as he 
has, then I will know true success.  I thank Dr. Mary Zey, my long-time mentor whose 
confidence in my capacity often exceeded my own.  Dr. Zey has shown me the importance of 
staying true to myself both academically and personally.  I am thankful for the many intelligent, 
coffee house discussions I have had with Dr. John Robertson.  I could not imagine having gone 
through all of this without your support and guidance.  I am especially grateful to Dr. Sam Cohn.  
How could I have ever produced this dissertation without your counsel?  You challenged me in a 
way that no one else dared.  Through it all, each of you has stood by me, and for that, I will be 
forever indebted.  
While I have had many friends at the university, I would be remiss if I did not single out 
the special contributions of Dr. Tim Lomax, Barbara Becvar, Kari Brae, and Brande Camp 
Yarnell.  Dr. Tim Lomax is the type of academic we should all strive to be – bright, dedicated 
and supportive.  Your assistance came at a time when I did not think there was any support left 
in the system.  Thank you.  To my “friend in the department,” Barbara Becvar, I could not have 
done it without you.  Thank you.  Kari, you shared your home with me when I was away from 
home.  Knowing that I could find a safe place to rest when weary was a true comfort. Thank you.   
To my dearest friend Brande Yarnell Camp, what a ride we have been on together.  To think I 
  
vii  
opposed you joining the research group so many years ago.  Who knew you would be one of my 
greatest sources of strength.  Thank you. 
A very special thanks to my father for reminding me what is most important in life and 
providing a strong foundation from which to build my life.  Most importantly, I want to thank 
my husband, Craig Carlo.  Your friendship and support have made the journey worthwhile.  My 
battles were your battles; my frustrations were your frustrations, so thank you for never letting 
me give up.  Through the years of long nights, computer crashes, and fits of frustration, your 
support never wavered.  I could not imagine traveling life’s path without you. 
  
  
viii  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Page 
 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ iii 
 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................ v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................ vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES..................................................................................................... xi 
 
CHAPTER 
 
 I INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1 
 
   Overview........................................................................................ 1 
   Research Problem........................................................................... 3 
   An Alternative Approach:  Method and Theory ............................ 5 
   Summary ........................................................................................ 6 
 
 II REVIEW OF LITERATURE .................................................................. 8 
 
   Overview........................................................................................ 8 
   Class Dominance and Political Power ........................................... 11 
   Structuralist State Theory............................................................... 17 
   An Alternative Approach ............................................................... 23 
   Summary ........................................................................................ 26 
 
 III DATA AND METHODS ........................................................................ 30 
 
   Overview........................................................................................ 30 
   Methodological Approach:  QCA .................................................. 34 
   Dependent Variable: Change in Industry Effective Tax Rate ........ 37 
   Seven Independent Variables ......................................................... 42 
   Sample and Unit of Analysis.......................................................... 59 
  
ix  
CHAPTER    Page 
   
 IV RESEARCH FINDINGS ......................................................................... 64 
 
   Overview........................................................................................ 64 
   Three Models of the Dependent Variable ...................................... 64 
   Correlation Analysis....................................................................... 66 
   Qualitative Comparative Analysis:  Results................................... 69 
   Three Separate Analysis:  Economic, Political, and Combined..... 71 
   The Economic Recovery Act of 1981 ............................................ 83 
   Summary ........................................................................................ 84 
 
 V CONCLUSIONS...................................................................................... 87 
 
   Overview........................................................................................ 87 
   Implications for Future Theory and Analysis ................................ 94 
   Limitations of the Study................................................................. 96 
   Recommendations for Future Research ......................................... 92 
   Conclusions .................................................................................... 93 
 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 95 
 
APPENDIX A ........................................................................................................ 104 
 
APPENDIX B ........................................................................................................ 105 
 
APPENDIX C ........................................................................................................ 122 
 
APPENDIX D ........................................................................................................ 123 
 
APPENDIX E ........................................................................................................ 125 
 
VITA   ........................................................................................................ 127 
 
 
  
x  
LIST OF TABLES 
  Page 
Table 3-1 Description of Independent Variables .................................................. 42 
Table 3-2   Industry Segment Descriptions.............................................................  62 
Table 4-1 Correlation Table:  Independent Variables for Each of Three 
 Dependent Variables.............................................................................  67 
Table 4-2 Raw Data Truth Table ..........................................................................  70 
Table 4-3 Truth Table:  Economic Causal Conditions for Three Models.............  74 
Table 4-4 Truth Table:  Political Causal Conditions for Three Models................  77 
Table 4-5 Truth Table:  Combined Causal Conditions for Three Models ............  79 
 
  
xi  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 Page 
 
Figure 3-1 Industry Effective Tax Rates and Percent Change in Industry 
 Effective Tax Rates...............................................................................  40 
 
Figure 3-2 Percentage Change in Industry Effective Tax Rates from 1979-81  
 to 1982-84.............................................................................................  41 
 
Figure 3-3 Average Firm PAC Contributions to the House Ways and Means 
 And Senate Finance Committees per Industry .....................................  45 
 
Figure 3-4 Total Number of PACs per Industry.....................................................  46 
 
Figure 3-5 Industry Ratio of Registered Lobbyists per Firm .................................  48 
 
Figure 3-6 Total Number of Washington Offices per Industry ..............................  50 
 
Figure 3-7 Ratio of Outside Lobbying Firms per Industry.....................................  51 
 
Figure 3-8 Total Number of Inter-Industry Connections ......................................  55 
 
Figure 3-9 Industry Production as Percentage of Total Economic  
 Production.............................................................................................  56 
 
Figure 3-10 Percentage of Industry Production Purchased by Federal 
 Government ..........................................................................................  57 
 
Figure 3-11 Average Number of Employees per Industry .......................................  58 
 
  
1  
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview 
Why is there no consistent measure of corporate political power?  News accounts detail 
corporate power as endemic, abusive, and corrupt.  Yet, no consistent measure or measures exist 
that can capture the seemingly obvious connection between corporate power and legislative 
favor.  In this study, I address the power relationships that exist among industries through an 
examination of the economic interdependency and political behaviors associated with legislative 
change and change in industry effective tax rates.  Current theories hold that either structural 
economic position or political strength leads to state response and favorable policy outcomes.  
Both theoretical perspectives, although conflict based, fail to address the degree to which 
political and economic factors coexist and work in conjunction with each other.  The existing 
class structure is segmented in such as way that it benefits some industries more than other 
industries.  This study focuses on what, when, and how U.S. industries are able to extract tax 
advantage from the Federal government, using the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 as the 
policy framework.  This Act serves as an excellent universal business policy from which to 
examine the dynamic relationships that exist between industry and the state. 
 The impetus for this study resulted from an annual Citizens for Tax Justice report on 
corporate freeloaders (McIntyre and Wilhelm 1985)that chronicled a pattern of increasing 
corporate tax avoidance for the two previous decades.  While it was not surprising to find that 
many of the largest U.S. corporations (based on total assets) pay little if anything in Federal 
taxes, the surprise was the enormous tax disparities that exist between industries.  
_______________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the American Sociological Review. 
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According to Federal law, from 1979-1984, U.S. corporations were subject to a Federal 
tax rate of 46 percent, however for the sample industries used for this study the average industry 
effective tax rate was 21.64% from 1979-1981 and 17.75% from 1982-1984.  During this period, 
the 386 firms, comprising the 18 industries in the sample, experienced a rise in net income of 
over $7 billion and their overall assets increased by over $345 billion.  Even with huge increases 
in income and assets, the taxes paid by the firms in the sample decreased by almost $11 billion.  
Contrary to the projected increase in Federal revenues projected by supply-side economists, as 
both industry profits and assets increased, corporate Federal taxes decreased.  The types of tax 
exemptions and exceptions provided in this legislation (for a brief description of the major tax 
changes in the new law see Appendix A) such as the use of accelerated depreciation schedules, 
safe-harbor leasing, and other tax provisions resulted in a significant decrease in total Federal 
revenue(Tempalski 1998).   
Only a select few industries were able to take advantage of the new tax law; the new tax 
law did not significantly benefit all industries.  Thus to claim that all corporations and all 
industries benefit uniformly from state actions would be misleading.  The eight industries that 
benefited the most from the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) experienced an average 
effective tax rate of 12% from 1982-1984 compared to the other ten industries that paid on 
average over 21% for the same period.  Significant differences between industry effective tax 
rates found in my sample ranged from an extreme low average of –21% to a high of 36.9% for 
the years 1982-1984.  Vast differences in industry tax rates, suggests that the largest corporate 
representatives of U.S. industries do not benefit as a single class interest, but rather that state 
(Federal) policies benefit some at vastly different levels. 
 Soaring inflation, sagging productivity, and increased foreign competition provided 
fertile ground for political change.  Legislators were desperate to stabilize the economy, and U.S. 
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business leaders brought with them promises that a supply-side tax cut would be the solution to 
halt the crisis.  Viewed as a cure for the ailing political-economic environment of the late 1970’s 
and early 1980’s, the 1981 Economic Recovery Act was a milestone victory for conservative 
business interests intent on restructuring the overall landscape of the political and economic 
environment.  The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was the culmination of a long battle to 
secure an accelerated deprecation schedule, reduce windfall oil taxes, and provide outlets for 
maximizing tax benefit for investments that exceeded current tax benefit levels through a safe-
harbor leasing provision.  Industries claimed that these provisions would stimulate economic 
growth.  Ironically in 1981, the same year in which the Economic Recovery Tax Act was passed, 
the Council of State Planning Agencies reported that the corporate tax incentives (primarily 
given to big business) had cost state governments millions, and were ineffective at stimulating 
economic growth through either increased investment or new hires (Chell 1981).  It was not 
surprising that in the same way, the National economic picture did not improve because of 
corporate tax breaks.  In fact, it is estimated that the cost to the nation was almost $176 billion in 
lost Federal revenue (Tempalski 1998).  In addition, the percentage of Federal revenue generated 
from corporate income tax decreased from 3.2% in 1971 to less than half that in 1982. 
 
Research Problem 
This study addresses the central question of why certain industries receive greater benefits from 
the state than other industries.  A critical component in this analysis is the development of new 
measures of economic interdependence in conjunction with a complete set of directed political 
actions that yield a model of industry political power that extends beyond existing research 
This new model of economic and political interdependence differs from previous work 
in two major manners.  First, for too long, research has focused on the capacity of U.S. business 
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to organize resources for political influence, but has failed to adequately address the impact of 
policy beyond the passage or failure of a bill.  If an industry cannot benefit from a particular 
action, it would be foolish to claim it as a political victory.  Clearly differentiated from studies 
that conclude with the passage or failure of a particular legislative act, this study extends the 
analysis of industry power from the constrained limited use of the passage or failure of 
legislation to that of the successful implementation of policy.  My research finally addresses the 
question of who wins by examining the associated economic conditions and political actions 
taken by “winning” industries.  Industries win when they are able to benefit from the change in 
policy, as is strongly apparent through the examination of industry effective tax rates.   
Second, this study directly addresses the methodological problems of past research with 
model development using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)(Ragin 1987).  The result is a 
series of strategic causal conditions that provide a more complete assessment of the conditions of 
industry power.  A large segment of literature on state theory consists of either case studies or 
historical comparative analyses, both of which often fail to address the complexity of overall 
conditions and subsequently arrive at findings that support a particular theoretical perspective 
but which often fail to address contradictory findings as significant.  In this study, a data driven 
qualitative methodology is used that systematically and empirically examines 18 industry cases, 
thus moving beyond historical description, and providing a foundation for analysis unparalleled 
in other qualitative research.     
 Further, quantitative studies on tax policy have also met with little consensus as to the 
relevance of either structural or political variables.  The limitations found in these studies consist 
of confounding levels of analysis and inconsistent or misspecified variable measurement.  My 
approach addresses past limitations through the examination of variable relationships that make 
up causal sets associated with the passage of the 1981 ERTA.  The analysis incorporates multiple 
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political strategies (four political variables) and economic conditions (three economic variables 
of industry-state interdependence), for which past research has failed to uncover consistent 
findings.  Overcoming these methodological limitations results in the development of more 
complete strategic models that allow for evaluation of dynamic and complex causal conditions.  
This form of qualitative inquiry allows for the deconstruction of the dependent variable as well 
as a move away from measures that lack social action (assets/market concentration). 
 In summary, this is the first qualitative comparative analysis study to address the distinct 
strategic political and economic mechanisms of power that lead to successful corporate tax 
avoidance.  In previous studies of effective tax rates both methodological and measurement 
limitations stifled the comprehensive understanding of how political behavior and economic 
conditions benefit select industries.  This study demonstrates the utility of qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) to effectively address complex related events that are omitted or 
confounded when using traditional regression techniques, as well as developing findings that are 
more generalizable than traditional qualitative findings. 
 
An Alternative Approach to Method and Theory 
The new methodological approach and improved measures used in this study strengthen our 
understanding of the relationship between conditions of industry strength  (economic condition 
and political action) and state response through policy outcomes.  Political behavior is no longer 
restricted to a single measure (e.g. campaign contributions).  In this study a series of political 
behaviors (which in regression analysis would suffer from problems of multicollinearity) provide 
a more complete assessment of directed political action than has been demonstrated previously.   
An important contribution made by this research is the introduction of a series of new 
variables that have not been a part of tax policy analysis in the past.  The new economic 
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measures (industry interdependence, total economic dependence, industry-Federal dependency, 
and employment strength) directly link theoretical concepts of economic strength to state favor.  
These new economic measures replace ineffective measures such as rate of unemployment and 
rate of investment.  The derivation of the new economic measures came from an industry 
production input-output matrix, developed for this project.  The use of these variables provides 
greater insight into the impact of political behavior and structural relationships, and thus adds to 
our understanding of the complex causal conditions that are involved in the state-class struggle.  
The explanatory causal conditions that emerge from this research contribute to our understanding 
of the nature of industry power and overcome many limitations in a field that has been rife with 
theoretical and methodological problems. 
 
Summary 
In summary, moving beyond the theoretically exclusive state theory models of class dominance 
and structural Marxism, my research supports a blended theoretical model.  The ‘theoretical 
exclusivity’ of these two theoretical models has contributed to the lack of a clear or consistent set 
of explanations in policy formation (Glasberg and Skidmore 1997).  The failure of past work has 
been its failure to address the most vital research question posed by theories by failing to assess 
who benefits and how.  The tax code is not a policy vehicle that yields uniform tax status.  In 
fact, the tax code purposefully benefits certain industries over others at vastly different rates 
(Pechman 1987).  National aggregate tax data indicates that change in tax rate is an incremental 
function that is rarely altered in any dramatic fashion since its inception.  Thus the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 which had an enormous fiscal impact, dramatically altering tax 
payments and shifting the tax burden through a pattern of tax redistribution, is a highly 
significant event (Campbell 1993).   
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My research evaluates the tangible outcome of tax policy by measuring change in 
effective tax rates between industries and assessing effective tax rate as they relate to political 
behaviors and structural economic conditions.  Tax winners take several forms.  Not only were 
some industries able to significantly reduce their effective tax rates (due to changes in tax 
policy), certain industries have benefited from tax law for a long time.  Tax loses are also 
identified and examined by economic condition and political actions for those industries that are 
unsuccessful in achieving significant changes in their effective tax rates.  My research 
demonstrates that a precise, albeit complex, picture of the political and economic relationships 
that are causally linked to tax policy outcome; and that above all supports a segmented intra-
capitalist class theory based on industry conflict. 
 
  
8  
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Overview 
The power of business (capital) has been a topic of interest to sociologists for over a century and 
a half.  Significant theoretical and empirical questions have emerged in response to questions of 
capacity for unified class action and degrees of state autonomy.  Emerging from early debates 
between pluralist (Dahl 1958; 1961; Polsby 1959; 1963) and elite theorists (Hunter 1952; Mills 
1956), contemporary policy research focuses on the conditions of business unity (Akard 1992; 
Domhoff 1990; Mizruchi 1989a; Quadagno 1984) and the nature of the state.  The state has been 
generally referred to as a captured, semi-autonomous (Offe 1974; 1984; Poulantzas 1978a), or 
autonomous agent (Skocpol 1980; Skocpol and Finegold 1982).  The result has been research 
agendas focused on state structures and policies that fail to examine political outcomes or policy 
impact (Glasberg and Skidmore 1997; McCammon 1994).  So, while research on political power 
should examine the question of who benefits or who wins and who loses after laws are passed 
(Domhoff 1983), the reality is that it rarely does. 
Little research has been conducted on tax policy.  No definitive conclusions exist 
regarding the causal mechanisms affecting tax policy formation or implementation.  Both 
qualitative and quantitative findings support a mixed set of causal relationships.  Problems with 
model development, methodology, and variable construction led to a confusing and incomplete 
picture of tax policy.  Integrating concepts from structural dependency and class dominance 
provide the basis for a new theoretical perspective that can address the complex political and 
economic relationships that develop. 
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Three broad theoretical frameworks guide much of the class-state power research: (1) 
class dominance (elite, power resource and business dominance), (2) state-centered, and (3) 
structural Marxism.  Theories positing class dominance focus on the capacity of business (elite 
interests) to coordinate, unify and thus dominate society (Domhoff 1990; Mills 1956; Useem 
1984).  Structuralism rejects the claims of instrumental Marxist and elite theories that a unified 
elite/capitalist/upper class exists, instead positing inter-industry and class competition, the 
existence of a relatively autonomous state, and the structural design of the capitalist state are the 
guiding mechanisms of power (Block 1977; Gold, Lo, and Wright 1975; Poulantzas 1978a).  In 
contrast, the state-centered theory (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Hooks 1990; 
Skocpol and Finegold 1982) posits that the state, with potential for autonomy, has “mechanisms 
that allow the state to operate independent of outside forces”(Glasberg and Skidmore 1997).   
While each of these frameworks distinctly posits where and with who power resides, 
they each fail to examine whether the groups advocating for change actually benefit from a shift 
in policy.  This research deficit is a result of both theoretical and methodological limitations.  In 
response to existing theoretical limitations, there has been a call for the development of an 
integrated state theory that addresses the contingent and varying nature of power relations 
(Glasberg and Skidmore 1997; Hooks 1993; Quadagno 1992a; Vogel 1989; Zey 1993). The call 
for a synthesis theory comes from the limitations of existing theories (Hooks 1993) strongly 
advocating the development of more mid-ranged theoretical models that accommodate 
historically contingent conditions.  The result is a framework that addresses state policy by 
systematically examining the structure of the state, institutional inertia of historical trends and 
settings; the interaction between state and class interests; and ultimately who benefits from 
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changes in policy (Glasberg and Skidmore 1997 ).  It is from this third perspective that I 
approach the multi-dimensional dynamic of class influence in Federal tax policy.1 
Theories of the state question whether capitalists, class interests, or the system of 
capitalism dominates the state policy.  The theoretical debate has evolved from demonstrating 
the mechanisms necessary for class identification to the examination of how and when class 
interests are effective.2  The intense interest in social welfare policy has provided clear examples 
of when class interests other than business achieve state response (Quadagno 1984).  This 
changed the debate from whether capitalists always achieve their objectives, to when capitalists 
achieve their objectives.  However, as will be discussed later, very little research has examined 
tangible outputs of political power, especially on tax policy.  While a significant part of 
sociological work still focuses on the process of policy formation, the challenge will be to 
develop a model that expresses the conditions of success not only addressing historically 
contingent factors, but also which addresses different contextual levels of political success.  If 
the analysis of class influence (power) stops with the passage of a bill or creation of an agency, it 
fails to address the objective of power --- to gain favorable outcomes.  The guiding definition of 
power used in this study is: 
Power:  the extent to which the outcomes of the population’s interaction with 
other populations favor its interests over those of others; acquisition of power is 
an increase in the favorability of such outcomes, loss of power a decline in their 
favorability; political power refers to the outcomes of interactions with 
governments (Tilly 1978: 55). 
 
 
                                                     
1 The word approach is important.  Glasberg and Skidmore (1997) present a thorough explanation of the 
emergence of  an approach that they label “accomodationist.”  This approach lacks the formal boundaries that are 
typically associated with a formalized theory.    
2 State-centered theory will not be addressed in this paper due to the fact that it fails to recognize the potentiality 
of varying degrees of state autonomy or condition. 
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While common interests, shared views and information, and organizational capacity are 
identifiable criteria for political action the analysis would be incomplete if it did not include an 
analysis of tangible success (Tilly 1978).  This chapter will cover the relevant sociological and 
interest group literature with primary attention given to the lack of significant work on the 
“causal conditions” associated with political success (Ragin 1987). 
 
Class Dominance and Political Power 
Sociological theory directly challenges pluralist claims that the capitalist class lacks the capacity 
to organize effectively.  Class dominance research (power structure, business dominance, class-
wide rationality) however, has clearly demonstrated the existence of an interconnected economic 
and political elite within the capitalist-upper class (Akard 1992; Domhoff 1983; 1990; 1996; 
Mills 1956; Useem 1982; 1983; Zeitlin 1980; Zey 1993).  Left unanswered is not whether class 
interests exist, or even if they have the capacity to organize, but rather whether this results in 
dominance or undue advantage within the broader population.  Rooted in historical accounts, 
these studies present a case for business unity by demonstrating the existence of key policy 
making organizations and groups that serve to coordinate positions and proactive agendas.  This 
body of work claims that the existence of a cohesive class serves as a proxy measure of power, 
leaving open the possibility that even though the class is cohesive, it could remain inert. 
Class dominance research centers on the exertion of class interests in two primary ways.  
First, a substantial number of historical accounts detail the cohesiveness of the business 
community integrated into the state apparatus.  Second, quantitative studies have focused on 
factors of political unity.  Unified behavior, defined as similarities in behavior, is most often 
measured through patterns of political action committee campaign contributions on behalf of 
class interests and/or the presence of interlocking directorates (Burris 1987; Clawson, Neustadtl, 
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and Bearden 1986; Epstein 1986; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994; Masters and Keim 1985; 
Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Mizruchi 1989a; Mizruchi 1989b; Mizruchi and Koenig 1986).  
While this research establishes patterns of interaction and even similarity in patterns of giving, 
neither of these two approaches demonstrates a consistent causal link between political behavior 
and state action or policy outcome.  In fact, the literature simply fails to measure tangible policy 
outcomes beyond the passage of a bill or creation of a new state agency.  Few have even 
attempted to substantiate the claim that when a favorable business policy is passed that it results 
in tangible outcomes.  My argument is that corporate power is the ability to engage in the 
political system in combination with the capacity to achieve desired goals over the demands and 
desires of others (Domhoff 1983) results in desired outcomes for those who have power. 
Extensive historical research exists detailing corporate political interaction with the 
state.  Research supporting class dominance demonstrates that even in cases in which other class 
interests are addressed by state action (labor, agriculture, welfare) the capitalist class had a 
distinct influence in the development, direction and final policy (McCammon 1994).  Domhoff 
(1996) revisited several historical cases (New Deal Agricultural policy, National Recovery 
Administration, welfare policy, and the growth of the military) in which state-centered theorists 
had claimed a level of state autonomy and concluded that state agencies are often  “captured” by 
capitalist associations and not autonomous of class actors. These historical accounts lend support 
to class dominance hypothesis regarding involvement in the political process, but they fail to 
address the consequences of the action. 
Political action committees (PACs) and lobbying efforts are often attributed as effective 
and sufficient measures of corporate power.  Research conducted by Clawson, Neustadtl and 
Scott (1992) provide an extensive look at the inner workings of corporate PACs.  Through 
interviews with PAC directors, legislative staff, and members of Congress, they build a case that 
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PACs, in particular corporate PACs, have excessive power over the political system relating to 
the development of legislation as well as agenda setting.  While it is not discernable as to 
whether PAC involvement directly affects congressional votes, evidence supports the premise 
that PAC activity is a necessary mechanism associated with access.   
Evidence abounds that links organizations associated with corporate PACs to candidate 
relationships.  These relationships result in the influencing of legislative committees, including 
but not limited to inclusion of language in bills, providing expert witnesses, and affecting the 
tone of legislation that is not directly pro-business.  Their findings are compelling, not because 
they reinforce an already strong belief that corporate PACs have influence, but because these 
findings highlight the role PAC organizations play in a more complex set of political activities.  
This is supported by other research findings (Clawson and Clawson 1987) and is extremely 
relevant in the time period in which my research is conducted.  Clawson and Clawson (1987) 
reported that the genesis of corporate political activism was really a phenomenon of the early 
1970’s; and was mobilized in the areas of policy formation, public opinion and campaign 
financing.  In 1974 there were twice as many labor PACs as corporate PACs, but by 1980 
corporate PACs outnumbered labor PACS, 4 to 1 (Clawson and Clawson 1987) with the greatest 
concentration of PACs found within the largest 100 manufacturing firms.3 
 Class dominance theory posits that vast economic resources available to corporations 
enable them to engage in political realms often restrictive for other populations.  The ability and 
likelihood of PAC and lobbying efforts are facilitated by greater organizational resources (Boies 
1989; Burris 1987; Clawson, Neustadtl, and Bearden 1989; Masters and Keim 1985; Neustadtl 
and Clawson 1988).  It is argued that greater access to resources allows large corporations to 
 
                                                     
3 Size of corporation is based on total assets.   
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participate in the legislative process on many levels including, but not limited to, campaign 
contributions, lobbying efforts, grassroots efforts, public-relations campaigns and also providing 
expert testimony (Vogel 1989).   Establishing a causal link for class dominance has proven 
difficult if not illusionary.  Unified business political action has long been the standard for 
measure of class capacity to dominate state action.  This work concentrates on corporate capacity 
to influence policy measured through assets, industry concentration, material interest (Boies 
1989; Epstein 1986); and their ability to coordinate resources often measured through network 
ties, interlocking directorates, and patterns of giving (political contributions) (Clawson and 
Neustadtl 1989; Clawson et al. 1986; Clawson et al. 1992; Mizruchi 1989a). 
Quantitative studies on the impact of corporate PACs on policy have been inconsistent.  
Overall, the weak relationship between campaign contributions and roll call votes could easily 
lead one to believe that PACs are not a significant or influential tool for affecting legislative 
decisions (Smith 1995).4  However, when contextual specificity (issue specificity) is taken into 
account Neustadtl (1990) found a weak negative effect associated with corporate PAC 
contributions and pro-business votes.  While this could lead one to assume that corporate PAC 
influence was inconsequential, it is just as likely that PAC’s make campaign contributions as a 
part of a more complex political strategy.  Neustadtl (1990) notes that it is likely that labor 
pursues a strategy of rewarding members for votes; business strategies are often different with 
focus on working to gain votes they might not have already secured. Once again, PAC behavior 
is an important but not complete measure of political influence. 
 
                                                     
4 A significant part of this research area deals with labor, consumer, and special interests such as environment in 
addition to corporate interests. 
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 Clawson, Neustadtl and Scott(1992) conducted a careful qualitative examination of the 
role of PACs and the effect of PACs (with their leadership and associations) to direct, or target 
policy.  They examined the manner in which PACs are formed, the way they raise money, to 
whom and why they give (including the seating of an ideologically positioned Congress), the 
degree to which business PACs are unified.  Generally, they asked how much power business 
has in the political system and whether that power relates to economic position, pointing out the 
assumed legitimacy with which businesses operate within the policy arena.  Legislators and 
business leaders alike have no problem justifying pro-business legislation because it is often 
implied or assumed that if it is good for business it is good for Americans.  In the case of the 
Savings and Loan bailout, there was relatively little opposition to legislation that called for a 
bailout of over $500 billion as compared to the controversial and highly debated legislation 
surrounding unpaid parental leave benefits(Clawson et al. 1992). They go on to state that it is 
important that we accept the fact that PACs are a vital part of corporate power and constitute 
business hegemony.  Their description of hegemony is valuable, especially their observation that 
business power is so pervasive that it is virtually unrecognizable similar to white treatment of 
blacks in 1959, business denies their power to dominate, but most who feel the impact would 
argue it otherwise.  A key finding is that businesses do seem to win in the policy making game, 
but it is because of a great deal of vigilance. 
In a longitudinal study, Jacobs (1988) investigated the relationship between 
manufacturing tax rates and aggregate concentration of assets.5  Using national aggregate data 
for all manufacturing firms, he found that asset concentration had a negative effect on effective 
 
                                                     
5 This study covered the time period of 1947-1978 and uses Holland and Meyers 1980 tax measure (Holland and 
Meyers 1980).   
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tax rates, while investment, unemployment, and profit had no effect.6  He makes the primary 
assumption that asset concentration is an adequate measure of political activity and thus a 
suitable proxy for political power.  However, in the manner in which he used asset concentration, 
it is questionable as to whether it is an appropriate measure of political power.  His measure of 
asset concentration may or may not be measuring political power of industry so much as it might 
simply be measuring the concentration of financial strength for the top 100 manufacturing firms.  
An interesting finding that Jacobs (1988) fails to examine is the question of why profits are not 
associated with taxes.  Higher profits should yield higher taxes.  He finds no relationship 
between profit and tax.  It is worth noting however that the issue of asset concentration (or any 
measure of resource concentration) is a questionable measure of class dominance, if what is 
measured is not the benefit of resource concentration.  
 A more direct measure of corporate political behavior is that of PAC membership or 
PAC contributions.  While the research on PACs has also met with mixed results, the percentage 
of corporate PACs to total PACs seems to have more predictive strength as well as reflecting 
actual political engagement rather than depending on the perceived capacity to act as measured 
by asset concentration.  Quinn and Shapiro (1991a: 866) found that the greater number of 
associated corporate PACs had a negative effect on corporate effective tax rates and either no 
effect of a slightly negative effect (depending on the model) for asset concentration.  They 
concluded that this supported previous research findings that PAC behavior that was similar but 
not formally organized was significant(see Mizruchi 1989a). This finding is in and of itself an 
interesting effect since PAC data is not available for years prior to 1974, which means that in 
their study data points prior to 1974 had a score of zero for PAC and yet it had an impact on the 
 
                                                     
6 Asset concentration measured as the assets from the top 100 manufacturing firms to total manufacturing assets.   
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overall model.  No support was found for lobbying, asset concentration or for any other class 
organization variable other than PACs.  The lack of consistent support for corporate political 
behaviors other than PACs may be related to measurement and methodology problems. 
 
Structuralist State Theory 
What if capitalist is but one of many competing class interests in society?  Rejecting the 
idealistic, and unrealistic, diffused power claims of pluralism, the neo-Marxist literature 
recognizes the impact of both capitalism and capitalists on state action.  Integrating the structural 
dependence of the state on capitalism and the interactive role of capitalism as it involves the 
continued accumulation of capital (Akard 1992; Block 1977; Lindblom 1977; Offe 1984; 
Poulantzas 1978b).  However, a divide exists that centers on the issue of a unified capitalist 
class.  Structural theories of capitalism claim that the state serves to reproduce the accumulation 
process and thus in essence appear to support the domination of capitalist interests.  In an 
analysis of labor law, McCammon (1994) describes how “state selectivity” results in the support 
of  policies that are important for the maintenance of employers and deny labor requests that 
could threaten the stability of the system of capital accumulation.  The role of the state is to 
intervene in matters of the economic and not the political; strikes over wages and benefits are 
permitted but power struggles that would undermine the ability of capital to control the work 
place is prohibited (McCammon 1994).   
 The structural foundations of capitalism determine the power relations of the state to 
society (Poulantzas 1978a) and as a result the capitalist state will favor long-term capitalist 
interests over short term capitalists demands.  Failure to sustain and promote growth in the 
economic system results in crises of legitimacy and threatens the state capacity to maintain 
control.  Left unchecked, these crises could lead to the removal of state actors.  Dominance of 
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capitalism, not necessarily capitalists, provides flexibility in this theory in explaining the 
existence of social policy and economic policies that are not pro-business.  In theory, the state 
acts on behalf of long-term capital even when such actions threaten economic hegemony.   
 Unlike class dominance theories, structuralism contends that policies are reflections of 
capitalist state structure as bound to the capitalist economy (Glasberg and Skidmore 1997; 
Jessop 1990; O'Connor 1973; Wright 1978) rather than domination by a class of individual 
actors.  A commonality between class dominance, elite and structuralist theories seems to be the 
recognition of capitalist hegemony.  Structuralists recognize the hegemonic nature of the 
capitalist class but ground it to the concept of system reproduction.  State action cannot be 
simply reduced to a political engagement, except to the degree that political influence is 
congruent with long-term economic requirements of capitalism (Poulantzas 1969). 
Rejecting the contention that a single unified upper/capitalist class dominates, structuralism 
supports a segmented class theory, has resulted in the label of  “elite-pluralist.”  Schumpeter 
([1918] 1954) proposed that  society was dominated by capitalist elites and that democracy was 
maintained by the competition (conflict) that arose between capitalist interests irrespective of 
any direct political organization (Block 1977; Poulantzas 1969).  The state’s role is to intervene 
on behalf of long-term capitalists interests rather than the short-term demands of a single firm or 
industry or class.  The dependent relationship between capital and the state insures that the state 
will most often act in concert with the demands of dominant sectors of capital when it is able to 
do so.7  In other words, if the demands articulated by a segment of capital are consistent with the 
reproduction and growth of capital then state action will be congruent.  This forces a 
 
                                                     
7 This study focuses only on inter-industry variations and does not include analysis of other capital interests such 
as labor.  Clearly, this is an area for future consideration. 
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reciprocating relationship between the state and capital.  Capital depends on the state for fiscal 
maintenance (structural-long term stability), and the state depends on the well-being of capital to 
maintain legitimacy (Jessop 1982; Poulantzas 1969). 
 Structural dependency theory contends that a dependent relationship exists between 
capitalists and the state.  A basic structural mechanism of the state is the need to generate 
revenue.  The argument is that economic instability (recession, unemployment, drop in consumer 
demand) threatens the viability of the state, resulting from declining rates of corporate 
investment.  This decline in investment is a central component to the concept of business 
confidence.  The system is part of an exchange between state actors, capitalists and workers, and 
state action is limited by “intersection of two factors – the intensity of class struggle and the 
level of economic activity”(Block 1987: 67).   The system described is one of dependence.  The 
“incentive structure” is the key tool business uses to gain desired outcomes through the state 
(Quinn and Shapiro 1991a) rather than political behavior.  Investment maintenance and capital 
accumulation are the central concern of state actors.  Competing capital interests, mediated by 
the state, achieve policies that reflect growth and maintenance in order to maintain the existing 
political/economic order (Quadagno 1992a; 1988) 
 Unlike class dominance theory, the structural theories recognize the presence of 
competing class interests.  The concept of segmented political hegemony clearly separates it 
from the class dominance perspective, even though both theoretical camps recognize the 
historically powerful position that corporations hold in the United States.  Sabato (1984) found 
that while the overall disagreement between capitalist interests may hinder any real class-wide 
agreement let alone class-wide rationality, it allows for the possibility for industry sector 
hegemony and power block hegemony.  Poulantzas (1969), Vogel (1989), Block (1977), 
Lindblom (1977) and Offe (1984) all claim that ‘no overt mechanism’ is necessary for capitalist 
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power to be exerted: rather the state acts as responsive to electoral demands as the overall well-
being of capital (Quinn and Shapiro 1991b).  Therefore, if structural explanations prevail, fiscal 
or geopolitical crises will explain state action, with no significant effect resulting from political 
organization.  The crisis of legitimacy (Lindblom 1977: 187) occurs when the demands of 
capital/business are not met, and will result in recession or economic stagnation through a 
process of disinvestment.  However, a serious limitation of this theoretical perspective is that it is 
difficult to measure direct effects. 
 A pure structuralist argument lays claim that state action is taken without direct 
intervention from a capitalist class (Block 1987).  Yet, in the wake of global competition the 
decline of several U.S. markets, the oil crises, and staggering inflation of 1970’s, such 
assumptions have become increasingly contested.  Historical accounts demonstrate that U.S. 
capitalist interests engaged in class-wide organization aimed at coordinating policy and shifting 
political ideology to support its demands(Akard 1992; Prechel 2000). 
 The centerpiece of structural theories rest on the premise that the state responds to the 
overarching demands of capital accumulation.  The belief is that the state is able to extract 
greater tax during period of geopolitical conflict.8  Structuralists argue that state actors are able 
to raise taxes during war (taking advantage of war-time spending) or economic crises 
(depression, not recession) because the threat of disinvestment is no longer an issue (Block 1987 
as found in Campbell and Allen (1994)).  During stable periods, the threat of disinvestment is the 
tool used by business to maintain low tax rates.  The general state of the economy is another 
critical component in the maintenance of the capitalist state.  During periods of expansion the 
state is hypothesized to have the ability to increase tax rates, while in times of economic 
 
                                                     
8 John Campbell (1993) provides an excellent summary of the literature of fiscal sociology.   
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contraction the state must decrease taxes in order to maintain business confidence (Block 1987; 
Lindblom 1977). 
 Evidence for the capacity of the state to tax during periods of expansion and contraction 
is mixed.  Salamon & Siegfried (1977a) in their study of 110 U.S. industries found higher profits 
resulted in higher taxes indicating that state actors can raise taxes during periods of economic 
expansion.  Jacobs (1988), on the other hand, found that a decline in profits or investment did not 
lead to lower taxes, although his findings have been questioned due to the fact that the time 
frame in covered was from 1948-78, thus missing major economic events (Campbell 1993).  
Prior to the late 1970’s, the dominant economic policy followed Keynesian principles that 
required state spending to stimulate economic growth while decreasing taxes (Block 1987), thus 
averting rising rates of unemployment and increasing investment.9  This era was marked by an 
active state role in both spending and tax policy.  Much of the same rational can be made for 
states to increase taxes when faced with budget deficits (Campbell and Allen 1994).  Block 
(1987) asserts that in times of extreme economic crisis, the state can raise taxes because the 
threat of disinvestment has already taken place.  This is makes investment rate a weak measure 
because, depending upon the circumstance, the researcher could interpret an increase or decrease 
as evidence of state action supporting structural theory. 
 Reversing the causal relationship, Williams and Collins (1997) posited that state action 
is in anticipation of future investment, rather than reacting to disinvestment. This comes in the 
form of what they term an ‘equilibrium theory of corporate taxation’(Williams and Collins 1997 
 
                                                     
9 It is interesting to note that Keynes feared unemployment as a factor of political instability if left unchecked 
could lead to radical movements (totalitarian, communist, fascist).  Thus the policy initiatives followed during from 
the 1940’s through the 1970’s, directed at controlling the rate of unemployment, lead to massive expansion of the state 
structure. 
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211).  They argue that the scale and scope required to coordinate all business interests is 
impossible and that at best industries or small segments of firms might act on behalf of 
purposeful political goals.  Their model reverses the causal order of tax on political-economic 
variables testing the exogeneity of micro-economic factors (political involvement and 
investment) to macro-economic factors of effective corporate tax rates.  The primary argument is 
that future expectations drive state policy rather than a reaction to business political strength or 
levels of investment, and the findings support their claims.  The fact that effective tax rates were 
found to be exogenous to both the number of PACs and rates of investment, Williams and 
Collins (1997) do not reject the idea that industries, firms, or particular interests have political 
strength, but rather they contend that a single business class is not a causal force affecting 
effective tax rate.  Their model indicated that when there is a shock to effective tax rate, 
investment decreases and the number of PACs increase.  Often the state uses offsetting practices 
to maintain a relatively stable revenue rate over time.  Granting tax benefits, without program 
reduction or elimination, results in a shift in tax burden onto another segment of the population.10 
 The work of Williams and Collins (1997) is directly countered by the class dominance 
and historical literature that details a response of the business community to economic threats 
from national and international sources.  Albeit contrary to the class dominance literature, it does 
pose an interesting matter for consideration.  If the variables of PACs, investment, and real 
income are exogenous to macro-policy then current models are flawed. 
 
 
                                                     
10 See Campbell and Allen (1994) for discussion of individual income tax increases distributed among mass 
population. 
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An Alternative Approach 
Researchers from both the structuralist and class dominance theoretical camps are quick to point 
out the limitations of each other’s theories.  Critics of structuralist theories point to the 
limitations in developing measurable concepts, the inability of the theory to question whether or 
not capitalists interests dominate, the fact that the structuralist measure of the capitalist 
hegemonic control of the state is the persistence of capitalism (thus tautological), and the 
overstated existence of class conflict (Domhoff 1967; Domhoff 1983).  Structuralists argue that 
class dominance is incorrectly specified because it does not examine class conflict, 
inappropriately assigns class consciousness, and the fact that business interests benefit more 
from a reactive rather than a proactive agenda (Hooks 1993: 38).   It is commonly recognized 
that the debate in state theory suffers from a theoretical stalemate based on “theoretical mutual 
exclusivity” (Glasberg and Skidmore 1997: 11). 
 Alford (1975) recommended the integration of the three paradigms of pluralism, elite 
theory, and class theory; in order to address state functions (consensus, domination, and 
reproduction) and forces that shaped the state and state action (as discussed in Kourvetaris and 
Dobratz 1982).11  Addressing the theoretical debate with a middle-range approach provides a 
basis for examining the contradictory findings, recognized as a strategy in advancing political 
analysis.12  Most historical accounts make an implicit, indirect argument for a synthesized 
theoretical approach with findings that indicate state response is often in conjunction with both 
direct capitalist demands and the relative importance of the structural position with which they 
 
                                                     
11 Several works are discussed in this article that demonstrate the theoretical integration found throughout the 
literature.   
12 Clearly middle-range theory is a concept developed by Robert Merton.  Also see (Glasberg and Skidmore 
1997) for a summary of work calling for a synthesized perspective includes (Campbell 1993; Gilbert and Howe 1991; 
Hooks 1993; Jenkins and Brents 1989; McCammon 1994; Prechel 1990; Quadagno 1992b).   
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occupy in the broader economy.  The structural role that business holds in the U.S. society 
reflects  “potential power” (Anker, Seybold, and Schwartz 1987: 98) that cannot be matched by 
other groups in society.  Therefore, a more complete theoretical model would incorporate both 
the economic structural relationship between industries, the state, and society as well as the 
particular political efforts in which industries engage to change their environment.  The model 
should be dynamic enough to allow for varying conditions of political power, economic strength, 
and state autonomy.  This will provide a model able to better address the complexities of 
interactions and power relations that exist between the state and business. 
 This research demonstrates the limitations of past models to adequately address the 
complex conditions and the institutional constraints that ultimately affect the success or failure 
of a business political agenda.  Theoretical models and research must account for the context of 
business-state politics.  Who wins, and how they win, can vary with the particular case, not 
simply in terms of historical conditions (e.g., in a period of crisis), but also in contextual context 
(type of legal action).  It is likely that industry political participation will vary with regard to 
particular areas of interest such as tax, labor, contract, and regulatory matters.  Advancing a 
perspective that demands the reduction of theoretical barriers, Glasberg and Skidmore (1997) 
propose an alternative  “accomodationist” approach, rooted in contingency theory.  This 
perspective is guided by three major premises: 
First, political mobilization is contingent, requiring both a perceived threat to 
that class’s or class segment’s interests and the organizational resources with 
which to advocate a political position.  Second, state agencies and policies 
interact with class-based political organizations in a dynamic process that 
modifies both the state and the political organizations.  And third, the specific 
relation between state agencies and class-based political organizations is 
historically contingent (1997: 11). 
 
Although not focused specifically on tax policy, contingency theory addresses structural 
relationships, institutional inertia of historical trends, and the dynamic relationship between the 
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state and outside class forces (Glasberg and Skidmore 1997:142-43).  However, this approach 
requires expansion and clarification. 
 Jessop’s contingency theory and Offe’s concepts of political authority and crises 
management (Jessop 1982), recognize the importance of the when component of class 
domination of policy formation as well as the dynamic exchange between capital and state 
actors.  Yet, for the theory to be effective, it must address whether a business entity is responding 
defensively to a perceived threat to capital accumulation (Prechel 2000; Zey and Swenson 1998), 
or offensively because of its economic and/or political strength.  Using perceived threat as a 
defining element of action lacks predictive clarity.  A universal business principle is that of 
capital accumulation.  A universal demand of business is increased capital flow.  Whether 
threatened or not, business interests might engage in political activity.  The scope of the theory is 
limited by claiming that action is simply the result of perceived threat.  An advancement of this 
theoretical line would claim that political mobilization occurs when it is advantageous and 
necessary.  Conditions of necessity might then be different from conditions of advantage.   
Consistent with the “accomodationist” approach, Campbell’s (1993) conceptual model 
of taxation addresses major policy shifts (rather than incremental changes) and effects on both 
tax levels and the structure of the tax system.  His model incorporates various levels of analysis 
addressing the mediating factors that surround tax policy.  In this model, change results from 
economic, geopolitical, or fiscal crises.  Corporate political organization and economic 
conditions provide stimulus for State response.  This response comes in the forms of change in 
tax rates, tax burdens and redistribution policies.  The demands of class and social groups affect 
State action, while the system of political representation mediates class and social groups.  This 
model provides a framework for studying the determination of tax policy; incorporating 
historically contingent relationships and setting conditions under which to expect state action, 
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yet it fails to specify mechanism of success.  The utility of this perspective lies in the recognition 
that varying conditions affect political response.  In addition, this perspective directs research in 
a direction that requires the comparison of class segments.  Recognizing that the State is not 
instrumentally responsive to a single class interest, a contingent or accomodationist approach 
demands that research focus on context and ultimately the outcome of policy.   
 
Summary 
Political theorists have long been interested in the relationship between economic strength and 
state action (Quadagno 1984).  In a democratic nation, the principle of power is often idealized 
as being equally distributed amongst the populace, vested in individual authority as promoted by 
pluralists.  Class dominance, Marxist, and neo-Marxist theories challenge the democratic ideal of 
pluralism, positing instead the disproportionate advantage that business interests (firms and 
industries) have in comparison to other segments of society.  Two basic sets of causal conditions 
serve as the basis of corporate political advantage over the State: (1) the ability of business to 
dominate the political process as a result of their resources, and (2) the structural constraints on 
the state to maintain economic order and capital growth.  The primary issue of contention 
between existing theories of the state and capitalist power is whether the capitalist class actively 
dominates the state, or whether the Sate is a semi-autonomous agent on behalf of the capitalist 
system. 
 Class dominance theory posits that through control of the largest corporations and the 
associated resources of capitalist organizations, business interests are able to organize political 
and ideological campaigns that result in domination the state.  Like neo-Marxist structuralist 
theory, class dominance theory recognizes the existence of competing business interests exist but 
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maintains that competing interests do not translate into public political battles (Domhoff 1978; 
1980; 1983; Useem 1984 ; Zeitlin 1980 as examples). 
 Structuralists contend that society is dominated by political elites and democracy 
maintained through competition (conflict) between capitalist interests absent or without regard to 
any direct political organization (Block 1977; Block 1987; Poulantzas 1969; 1978a ; 1978b as 
examples).  State dependency on economic growth and stability ensure that the state will 
consistently work on behalf of dominant sectors of capital.  Declining market conditions serves 
as a major motivating factor for both class organization and state action.   
My model draws from the “accomodationist” or contingency approach, positing power 
relationships as both reciprocating and embedded in the institutional arrangement.  The model 
developed in this research includes multiple measures of industry political power focused on the 
mechanisms affecting tax policy implementation.  Through the examination of conditions of 
political influence, micro-political behavior and macro-economic structural conditions, this study 
examines who benefits and how.  Three new measures of economic strength and a more 
comprehensive model of political behavior are incorporated using qualitative comparative 
analysis.  This dissertation represents the first stage of a multi-stage research agenda directed at 
uncovering the mechanisms of industry political power.  Integrating both class dominance and 
structural Marxist variables, within a contingent or accomodationist approach, certain conditions 
and assumptions are made in this study: 
• Power relationships are contingent historical events. 
• Any examination of “winners” must take into consideration categories of 
beneficiaries.  The concept of winner must be clearly defined. 
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• Power relationships exist within specific context.  Power models must be content 
specific and not generalize without evidence.  Conditions of success in tax policy 
may vary from a successful outcome in environmental policy. 
• A model of power must be able to address the existence of competing class interests 
and measure the degree to which some benefit over others, or the degree to which 
benefits coalesce between industries. 
• The question of who wins shifts to who benefits and how. 
• The relationship between industry and State is governed by both political and 
economic variables.  It is through distinct patterns of economic strength and political 
action that yield success in tax policy implementation.   
The following analysis follows addresses deficiencies of past research (in terms of 
measurement, methodology and theoretical concepts).  Failure to address varying conditions of 
capitalist unity, and the failure to address circumstances in which state actors respond with 
“relative-autonomy” leave analysis of class power pointing to the mechanisms of control without 
the ability to causally link these to policy outcomes.  In addition, the “class-wide” rationality 
fails to address the variation in benefactors within the capitalist class dismissing conflict as if it 
is of little or no consequence 
 The empirical model developed in this research integrates a variety of causal conditions 
that exist within a complex set of dynamic interactions between state and industries.  Resisting 
the exclusivity of the original theoretical models, the synthesis of both state and class theories 
incorporates the effect of political influence and structural economic strength on tax policy 
outcomes.  These two primary “mechanisms” of political power are the dominant measures that 
appear in the extant literature.  The method used in this research will not address the statistical 
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relevance of the hypothesis, but will instead present a more exacting model of political influence 
than has existed in the past.  
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Overview 
The primary aim of this study is to examine the effects of industrial political behavior and 
structural economic conditions on industrial tax policy outcomes.  The specific policy outcome 
analyzed is the change in industry effective tax rate, resulting from changes in the U.S. tax code 
made with the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (referred to as ERTA81).  
This 18-industry segment analysis examines change in industry effective tax rates from 1979-
1981 to 1982-1984, as the direct result of tax code changes included in ERTA81.  The 1981 
Economic Recovery Tax Act was the legislative vehicle for a tax revolution aimed at eliminating 
corporate taxes.  The universal nature of tax policy as an issue of interest to all businesses in 
conjunction with the significant increase in coordinated political activity make it an appropriate 
case for the study of corporate power.  The inability of past research to clarify the causal 
mechanisms of political power relating to tax benefits, make it a significant topic for research.   
 
Case Selection 
The selection of both the timeframe and type of legislation was critical.  During the late 1970’s 
corporate political activity escalated while the business community publicly blamed the Federal 
government for cost infringements from union protections (in the form of minimum wage, health 
care, and worksite protection), environmental regulations, and, significant to this study, high tax 
rates.  Otto Eckstein, president of Data Resources Inc. in 1979, claimed that industrial hardships 
resulted from demand side economic plans (including high corporate and individual marginal tax 
rates), fuel shortages (due to a tough winter and the Iranian oil embargo), and union strikes 
(Business Week 1979b).  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss labor issues or 
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international oil reserves, however, tax policy, vital to the United States business community is 
the focus of the research. 
 The selection of this particular tax act centers on the fact that during this period 
organized business political behavior, although relatively recent, was increasing at an 
extraordinary rate.  Described as “the largest corporate tax reduction in over 50 years,” this 
measure also represents a legislative issue of universal importance to all corporations (Tempalski 
1998). 13  The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was a tremendous victory for the business 
community, for it reduced the overall tax burden.  However, some industries benefited at rates 
far greater than other industries, and certain industries suffered a tax increase.  This paper 
addresses the political and economic mechanisms that affected legislative development and 
ultimately policy implementation.  The universalistic property of tax policy makes it ideal for 
comparing economic power and political effort between and among industries, accompanied by 
a rich history that chronicles the “winners” and “losers” of the tax battle.  Winners, for example, 
benefited from special considerations, provisions appear in the tax code to accommodate 
windfall profits, energy rates, real-estate transactions, research and development and other such 
items that allow a certain industries to benefit from particular transactions and economic 
engagements.   
 As documented by the U.S. Treasury, ERTA81 was the largest tax reduction package in 
the history of the United States (Tempalski 1998).  Previous changes to the tax code occurred in 
1978 (effective in fiscal year 1979) with a reduction in the top corporate marginal tax rate from 
52% to 46%.  The next major tax act to follow ERTA81 was the 1984 Deficit Reduction Act 
 
                                                     
13 Tax legislation under the administration of George W. Bush has yet to be fully evaluated with regard to total 
economic impact, but could possibly exceed the 1981 ERTA.   
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(effective January 1, 1985).  While certain technical corrections to ERTA81 were included in the 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, the only significant change was the repeal of 
safe-harbor leasing (effective in fiscal year 1984).  Industry demands for tax reductions had been 
percolating in the Congress and the White House since the Kennedy Administration.  The 
growing role of international capital and a decline in American corporate hegemony marked a 
shift of corporate political behavior and attitude (Clawson and Clawson 1987) that called for 
governmental solutions to business crises and rejected programs that directed monies toward 
governmental social spending, taxation, and regulation.  The timeframe for this study covers the 
years 1979 thru 1984, examining industry political and economic variables as they affect 
effective tax rates from 1979-1981 and then from 1982-1984.   
During the 1970’s, corporate leaders claimed that they had to shift practices and engage 
in a figurative “fight for our (their) lives” (202).14  In the midst of a severe recession (a decline in 
GDP for two consecutive quarters) at the end of the 1970’s, corporate America was not only 
demanding legislative action on tax reform, they had convinced the American people that 
corporate downturn was a result of governmental encroachment and excessive taxes.  Many 
average Americans suffered from a tax code that was non-responsive to inflationary income 
increases.  Although technically making higher wages, taxpayers were unhappy with the jump in 
tax brackets when their standard of living had not improved.  This made the average Americans 
keenly aware of tax inequity, and as anti-tax sentiment grew strong throughout the country, key 
U.S. business interests benefited. 
 The tax sensitive political climate provided fodder for the rising number of corporate 
political entities in Washington D.C.  The dramatic increase in organized corporate political 
 
                                                     
14 See (Silk and Vogel 1976) for an in depth examination of corporate attitudes. 
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behavior resulted from a revision of the campaign financing laws in an attempt lessen the impact 
a single large donor could have on an administration in addition to SUN-PAC decision that 
allowed corporations to solicit from stockholders and employees (Clawson et al. 1992) from 
1971-1975.15   The irony was the proliferation of corporate organizational PACs that effectively 
coordinated single donor contributions on behalf of business and increased the influence that 
corporate entities would have over legislators.  A dramatic increase in the number of corporate 
PACs is by the 1726 percent increase in the corporate PACS from 1977 (89 corporate PACs) to 
1983 (1,536 corporate PACs) (Sabato 1984: 11) 
 Policy formation, guided with a significant increase in financial support from corporate 
donors, emerged from both moderate and conservative think tanks.  Supply-side economics 
gained support from the business community because it recommended drastically reduced tax 
rates, the need to drastically reduce labor costs, and the elimination of most regulatory 
restrictions.  The paradigm shift in economics occurred as Keynesian (demand-side) economics 
became the governmental scapegoat, blamed for exacerbating productivity and contributing to 
market slowdowns.  The business press made sure that these themes were well established 
(Business Week 1979a).  While it is unclear as to whether governmental policies have ever been 
strictly Keyensian, did not matter.  The conservative revolution targeted for elimination 
everything and anything that stood in the way of capital accumulation. 
 
Research Design 
This study examines the relationship between economic condition and political action variables 
on an industry level on change in industry effective tax rates.  The sample is from the Fortune 
 
                                                     
15 See (Clawson et al. 1992) for a complete discussion of the corporate PAC law and policy shifts during this period.  
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500 Industrial and 300 Service company lists for 1981.  The 18 major industry segments 
(categories) used, represent the industries associated with the firms in the 1981 Fortune listings 
(see Appendix B).  The independent variables were derived in two primary manners.  First, 
corporate data from the 1981 Fortune lists was aggregated by industry for the following 
variables:  Effective Tax Rate (TAXCHANGE), PAC campaign funding to the House Ways and 
Means and Senate Finance Committees (PACFUND), number of PACs (NUMPAC), number of 
Washington Offices (WASHOFF), number of registered lobbyists (REGLOBBY), number of 
hired political consultants (HIREDGUN), and number of employees (EMPLOYEE).  The second 
set of independent variables were developed using national aggregate industry data.(Young and 
Planting 1983) in order to construct an industry-economic input-output matrix for the 
independent variables:  total industry economic contribution (TOTALECO), number of inter-
industry connections (INTERDEP), and level of Federal-industry economic interaction 
(DEPFED).  These variables represent the economic position of an industry, and are the type of 
data considered by legislators and used by lobbyists to defend the importance of their particular 
position or decision on industry issues.   
 
Methodological Approach:  QCA 
The methodology used in this study is a key issue.  Methodological problems of past research, 
have failed to uncover a consistent model of business class political power.  As discussed in the 
review of literature, contradictory and inconclusive findings, result from inappropriate 
measurement as well as the lack of attention given to policy outcomes.  Measurements used in 
the past have fallen short and stagnated the development of more complex explanations of 
corporate tax avoidance behaviors.   
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 The intricate nature of political power emerges from the existence of multiple paths to 
successful tax policy outcome.  Complex political strategies and economic motives surround 
legislative events.  Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a bridge method between 
qualitative and quantitative studies (Ragin 1987; Ragin 1994) that enables the analysis of 
multiple causal sets that lead to the same outcome. This approach allows the researcher to 
systematically examine complex comparative cases, regardless of sample size.  However, it is 
exceptionally useful for small-N samples that are large enough to be hampered by in-depth 
historical comparative or case studies and too small to allow for the application of multivariate 
statistical procedures.  This is why qualitative historical studies have provided compelling 
accounts of events that support both class dominance and structural semi-autonomous models, 
but which cannot be quantitatively demonstrated. 
 Qualitative comparative analysis allows for an “assessment of complex patterns of 
multiple and conjunctural causation” (Ragin 1987: 71).  Macro social events face challenges of 
both limited number of actors and events (e.g., industries, countries, revolutions, and strikes) 
making statistical analysis difficult if not impossible.  QCA is more effective at addressing the 
complexity of comparative macrosocial units of analysis that are typically plagued with the 
small-N problem.  My sample is comprised of 18 industries compared between two periods; far 
too few data points for a quantitative methodological approach to yield a test of statistical 
significance, and far too complex a situation to assess using a conventional case study.  
Resolving the problem of methodology required an approach capable of managing data without 
the limitations of regression analysis. 
 For the purpose of this evaluation, regression techniques were unworkable because of 
the small sample.  In addition, regression analysis requires the elimination of measures that lack 
statistical power, in an attempt to reduce the chance of making a Type-II error.  Conditions that 
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occur less frequently often fail the test of significance, and often macro-social events do not 
consist of enough data points to establish causality.  A considerable strength of QCA, a 
qualitative approach, is that it provides flexibility when using events that occur only 
occasionally.  QCA allows for the consideration of each causal set regardless of whether one or 
1000 occurrences took place.  Each positive outcome remains a valid explanation of events thus 
rejecting traditional statistical tendencies to discount an infrequent causal set for another that 
occurs with greater frequency.  For this analysis, qualitative comparative analysis, is the 
methodological approach that provides a framework for evaluating numerous cases and the 
ability to address and evaluate “casual complexity”(Ragin 1987: 168) and “holistic comparison” 
(Ragin, E.Mayer, and Drass 1984: 228). 
 Boolean logic provides the opportunity to develop a model(s) capable of adapting and 
accounting for changing (varying) conditions over time, because it addresses the unique 
relationships between causal conditions.  To use this method successfully, the researcher must 
abandon (at least temporarily) the constraints of statistical inference and test of significance, 
replacing the importance of a single variable with a set(s) of causal conditions.  This method 
places primary importance on the manner in which variables come together, considered as a total 
set of conditions, that together result in a particular outcome.  Boolean algebra, combines sets of 
causal conditions (variables) with associated outcomes.  The number of independent variables 
(binary outcomes) determines the number of possible outcomes for any given set.  In this case, 
there are 27 (128) possible outcomes.  A causal set is represented by each row of the truth table.  
Like causal sets (rows) are combined and then minimized to produce the simplest number of 
expressions necessary to cover all possible causal explanations (Ragin 1987).   
 The use of QCA requires special preparation of the data.  All variables (dependent and 
independent) must be nominal-level measures and are coded a “1” (presence/high) or “0” 
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(absence/low) value for each measure.  In my study, data thresholds reflect high and low values, 
rather than presence or absence of a condition.  While theory serves as the primary basis for 
measurement development, in this study the theory broadly predicts winners and losers, but does 
not dictate a cutoff for high and low categories.  Both “high-1” and “low-0” categories are 
developed for each item according to variable averages or in some cases apparent breaks in the 
data.  Although somewhat arbitrary, this approach to data classification has proven to be quite 
robust and often aligns with variable means (Ragin et al. 1984).16 
 After assigning each measure a “1” or “0” value, a truth table (a visual expression of the 
observable data) was constructed (detailed in Chapter IV).  The goal of the truth table is to obtain 
causal formulas of prime implicants, identifying (if possible) necessary and sufficient causal 
conditions.  For a condition to be necessary, it must be present in all cases with a particular 
outcome (1 or 0) and not in any of the cases with the opposite outcome.  For an outcome to be 
sufficient, it must be the only causal condition associated with an outcome.  While a complete 
truth table would be comprised of all possible logical combinations of events, in practice the 
number of causal sets does not exceed the number of observed cases.17 
 
Dependent Variable:  Change in Industry Effective Tax Rate 
The dependent variable is change in average industry effective tax rate (TAXCHANGE) 
between the three years before (1979-1981) and three years after (1982-1984) after the passage 
 
                                                     
16 The approach used in this research assigns high and low values to all measures.  It is would have been 
possible to incorporate an “don’t care” or “unsure” classification for those values that fall between the extreme 
values, but I did not use this option.   
17 The total number of possible causal sets for this study would be 128 or 27.   
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of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.18  Domhoff (1967) recognized that taxes are 
reflective of the power structure and went so far as to claim that tax levels could be used as a 
measure of power.  The reason taxes or tax rates can be used to measure power is based on the 
dependent relationship between revenue generation by industry and the states need for revenue 
(Alford and Friedland 1975).  The effective tax rate is a reflection of the efficiency of the 
corporation and/or industry to use the special or particular tax provisions within the tax code to 
their advantage.  Special tax code provisions most often result from special interest groups 
affecting economic policy decisions (Siegfried 1974) to their advantage. 
 Although there is some debate within the economic and tax literature as to the 
appropriate measure of effective tax rate, the most appropriate measure for this study is simply 
calculated as actual taxes paid divided by pre-Federal tax net income.19  Effective tax rates were 
constructed from firm level data, aggregated by industry.  Tax and financial data were gathered 
using Compustat, a Standard & Poor’s database (Standard & Poor's 1999).  This database 
provides financial information with a primary audience of corporations and institutional 
investors.  Corporate financial statements are recorded and standardized making items 
comparable that might require tremendous recalculation if taken directly from a financial 
statement.  Compustat does not provide a specific measure of effective tax rate, therefore the 
construction of this variable (see Equation 3-1) includes two Compustat items: Item 63 (Federal 
 
                                                     
18 Variables used in this study follow a notation style of capital letters connoting a strong or high score on the 
measure, while lowercase letters represent the absence or low score on a particular measure. 
19 The debate within the tax literature stems mostly from a corporate concern in inconsistent reporting rather 
than a interpretation of policy.  Various methods are used some based on assets rather than net income, some that 
adjust for future taxes, or recalculate past years given current year deductions, etc.  See Spooner (1984) for a complete 
review of measure limitations. 
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Income Tax – current) and Item 172 (Net Income) averaged for the years 1979-1981 and 1982-
1984.  
Equation 3-1.  Formula for Calculating Effective Tax Rate 
 
Federal Income Tax Paid by Industry 
                                                                               = Effective Tax Rate 
Net Domestic Pretax Profits before Federal Income Tax 
 
The denominator is profit minus state and local taxes (or net income + Federal taxes) and the 
numerator is simply current Federal taxes due (see Equation 3-1).  This is a conservative 
measure of effective tax rate.  Many studies attempting to illustrate the abuse of corporate power 
over the State often chose a total income amount based on “profit”.  Failure to account for state 
and local taxes serves to inflate the profit figure.  If an inflated profit figure is used then the 
effective tax rate will also be artificially lower.   
The tax measure used in this study is net income + federal tax/federal tax, generated 
from the Compustat industrial annual data files.  The total net income and total taxes paid for 
each industry for the three years prior (1979, 1980, and 1981) to the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of 1981 and the three years (1982, 1983, and 1984) after the tax change were used to 
compute the average effective industry tax rate.  Using this measure adjusts for state and local 
taxes in order to get a more accurate measure of Federal tax.20   
During this time, the published highest marginal tax rate, by definition the tax rate paid 
on the last dollar earned, was 46 percent.  In many cases, industry effective tax rates were far 
below the marginal rate for both 1979-1981 and 1982-1984 (see Figure 3-1).  During 1979-1981 
 
                                                     
20 State and local taxes vary significantly between states and cities.  If the dependent variable of effective tax 
was taken prior to adjusting for state and local taxes, it would dramatically inflate the profit levels and thus artificially 
reduce the level of tax. 
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effective tax rates ranged from 10.86% to 55.18% compared to 1982-1984 when the effective tax 
rates ranged from –21.50% to 36.99%.  The average for all industries from 1979-1981 was 
24.45% and from 1982-1984, it was 15.76% with an average change of 8.69%.  Three industries 
(automobile, diversified financial, and general manufacturing) secured extremely large 
reductions in effective tax rate.  After adjusting for these three industries, the average change in  
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Figure 3-1.  Industry Effective Tax Rates and Percent Change in Industry Effective Tax Rates 
 
industry average effective tax rate is 4.23%.  Establishing the threshold for the dependent 
variable at five percent meets the confidence level at a 95 percent level (see Appendix C for 
descriptive statistics).  Therefore, if an industry reduced their effective tax rate five percent or 
more from t to t+1, that industry was coded a score of 1.  All industries with an effective tax rate 
change of less than five percent were coded a score of 0. 
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Effective tax rates are also subject to historical trends.  Seven of the 18 industries had an 
effective tax rate below 20% for both periods (see Figure 3-2).  This means that for the six years  
TAXCHANGE Per Industry
taxchangeTAXCHANGE/HI
STLOW
TAXCHANGE
-30%
-15%
0%
15%
30%
45%
G
EN
M
A
N
A
U
TO
D
FI
N
FA
B
M
ET
C
H
EM
O
IL
/G
A
S
A
ER
O
D
R
U
G
S
TR
A
N
R
ET
A
IL
U
TI
L
M
EA
S
TE
X
TI
LE
PR
IN
T
EL
EC
T
FO
O
D
PA
PE
R
R
U
B
B
ER
Pe
rc
en
t C
ha
ng
e 
fr
om
 1
97
9-
81
 to
 1
98
2-
84
 
 
Figure 3-2.  Percentage Change in Industry Effective Tax Rates from 1979-81 to 1982-84 
 
examined in this study, these particular industries avoided the marginal tax rate by over 26%, 
paying less than half the marginal rate.  Three industries (Chemical, Oil/Gas and Diversified 
Financials) were able to secure both the five percent reduction in effective tax rate, while 
maintaining a historically low effective tax rate below 20%.  While the dependent variable used 
in this study reflects the change in effective tax levels, the issue of historically low tax levels also 
has an impact on the causal sets.  Three models are developed and presented to address this 
issue.  The first model consists of all 18 industries.  The second model combines historically low 
and tax change industries.  The third model removes those industries that had historically low tax 
rates, but that were unable to achieve the 5% or greater change in effective tax rate.  Evaluation 
of each of the variable sets (economic and political) included three models.  The final analysis 
was of the complete variable set across all three models. 
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Seven Independent Variables 
In total, seven independent variables are included in the final analysis (see Table 3-1).  These 
variables are a combination of economic conditions and political behaviors relevant to the 18 
industries studied.  QCA requires that all measures be transformed into dichotomous values.  The 
construction of each of the measures, in addition to the establishment of appropriate threshold 
values, is discussed below.   
 
Table 3 -1.  Description of Independent Variables  
 
 
Political Resources 
A key question in the area of corporate power is how organizations pursue needs through the 
establishment of an agenda and the use of political action.  Knoke (1990) points to various forms 
 
Independent Variable 
Acronyms Used For 
Variables 
 
Variable Description 
 
 
Variable Thresholds 
 (high scores = 1  
and low scores = 0) 
 
PACFUND 
Campaign contributions to 
members of the House Ways and 
Means and Senate Finance 
Committees 
≥ $3663.00 per firm average 
within industry 
REGLOBBY Number of registered lobbyists on behalf of firms in industry ≥ 1:1 ratio 
HIREDGUN Ratio of hired lobbyists or lobby firms per industry ≥ 0.4: 1 ratio 
PACNUM Number of PACs per industry ≥ 15 per industry 
DEPFED 
Percentage of per industry goods 
purchased by the Federal 
Government 
≥ 3% Federal purchases per 
industry total production 
TOTALECO 
Percentage each industry makes 
up of the total production 
economy. 
≥ 3.5 % industry/total 
production 
INTERDEP Number of industry connections at 2% 
≥ 10 industry to industry 
connections at 2 percent 
Note:  Variables listed above are those included in the final analysis. 
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of public action that can be taken by an organization including:  lawsuits, letter writing 
campaigns, comments on proposed regulations, meeting with members of congress and/or staff, 
testifying at hearings, coalitions, contributing to campaign efforts, fund-raising, and other 
resource deployment tactics.   These are forms of “direct participation” (Heath, Douglas, and 
Russell 1995) that require corporate actors to engage in certain activities. A great deal of 
research has centered on PAC donations, yet as a single measure it is ineffective.  Industries 
employ a number of political strategies, of which PAC involvement is but one option.21  Placing 
importance on a single political strategy is a limitation of past quantitative studies.  Often when 
faced with multiple political measures, problems of mulitcollinearity demanded the elimination 
of key variables.  Using QCA, it was possible to create a more inclusive measure of political 
participation that includes a series of political strategies:  committee directed PAC contributions, 
total number of PACs per industry, the number of registered lobbyists in each industry, the 
number of Washington D.C. offices per industry, and the number of outside lobby firms hired by 
each industry. 
 
Political Action Committees 
A number of qualitative studies support the relationship between PACs and legislative outcomes.  
The competitive drive between business organizations requires some form of political 
participation (Keim 1988).  Measures of political activity are often reduced to PAC membership 
or financing.  Often PAC measures are aggregated across all congressional elections, these 
 
                                                     
21 In an early examination of the PAC data it is clear that election considerations are key, but not the only 
indicator of influence.  PAC contributions are carefully given out to those members in election cycles and when not in 
an election cycle, PAC contributions are virtually nonexistent for a candidate.  Therefore in this analysis only some of 
the Senate members were up for re-election and therefore their PAC dollars will be quite limited.  If my analysis 
centered only on PAC contributions, it would miss the other forms of influence that take place even in non-election 
years.   
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figures lack specificity of intention.  For example, if a contribution is given to a member of a 
committee for which an industry has a regular relationship, it might have a different impact than 
a contribution to a new congressional member, or even a member that has been opposed to pro-
business legislation in the past.  Even less “connected” to outcome is the measure of asset 
concentration as a proxy for political power.  As discussed in Chapter II, asset concentration 
assumes political engagement.22  Industry political activity takes on several forms and together 
comprises a strategy set.  The array of political strategies must also be associated with a 
purposive action (means-end) rather than general action when attempting to establish a link 
between policy outcome and political activity.  In a recent Bureau of Economic Analysis study, 
PAC contributions were significantly associated with member seniority, committee assignments 
and legislative reputation (Kroszner and Stratmann 2000).  Building on this finding, the measure 
of industry PAC contributions used in this study concentrates on two primary congressional 
committees: House Ways and Means and Senate Finance.  Since these two committees are 
responsible for the development of tax legislation, campaign contributions to members of either 
committee expresses a desire to influence the direction, content, and outcome of particular 
legislation.  The members of these two committees are responsible for the development of tax 
legislation and are the most likely to successfully impact the final language of the bill. 
 Grenzke (1989) recognized the need to examine many PACs as it relates to legislative 
outcomes.  While she found that a single PAC is not able to affect policy outcomes, she 
advocated that PAC effect should be tested as to whether “combined contributions from many 
PACs may influence members’ votes” (Grenzke 1989:18).  Measuring political behavior with 
 
                                                     
22 I found no significant relationship between asset concentration and tax policy outcome (correlation = 0.25, 
and r2 = 0.05) in the sample used for this study. 
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respect to industries is a departure from past work that focused on individual firm or a broad 
manufacturing classification.   
 Corporate PAC contributions were collected from the Federal Election Commission 
Candidate Index of Supporting Documents for the 2-election cycles, 1977-78 and 1979-80, for 
all members of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees (see Appendix D 
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taxchangeHISTLOW/
taxchange
TAXCHANGE
$0
$2,000
$4,000
$6,000
$8,000
FA
B
M
ET
PR
IN
T
M
EA
S
TE
X
TI
LE
R
U
B
B
ER
G
EN
M
A
N
TR
A
N
EL
EC
T
FO
O
D
R
ET
A
IL
C
H
EM
A
ER
O
A
U
TO
D
R
U
G
S
O
IL
/G
A
S
D
FI
N
U
TI
L
PA
PE
R
A
ve
ra
ge
 F
ir
m
 P
A
C
 C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
 to
 H
ou
se
 
W
ay
s a
nd
 M
ea
ns
/S
en
at
e 
Fi
na
nc
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
pe
r 
In
du
st
ry
 
 
Figure 3-3.  Average Firm PAC Contributions to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance 
      Committees per Industry 
 
for a complete list of members) that were involved in an election or re-election campaign during 
this period.  Only the contributions made by the sample corporations are included in this 
measure.  No industry association or party resources are included.  Each industry is compared to 
the overall firm average for PAC contributions.  The overall (total sample) firm average PAC 
contribution is $3,663 (386/1.4 million).  The first break in the data above the $3,663 amount is 
found at the level of $4,000 per firm average (within each industry).  In order to achieve a 
confidence level of 95 percent the threshold would have to be set at  $4,610.  For the purpose of 
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this study, the threshold score for those industries with strong or high PAC contributions is set at 
$4,000.  Industries with an average per firm contribution of $4,000 or greater are coded a “1” 
score, and those industries that had less than $4,000 per firm contributions are coded a “0” score 
(see Figure 3-3). 
 
Number of PACs Per Industry 
The total number of affiliated PACs per industry (NUMPAC) captures the general influence of 
industry PACs across Congress.  PAC data associated with the 1981 Fortune sample firms were 
collected using the Federal Election Commission PACRONYM list, and double checked against 
The PAC Directory:  A Complete Guide to Political Action Committees (Weinberger and Greevy 
1982) from 1979-1981.  As before, only PACs directly associated with the sample firms are  
NUMPAC per Industry
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Figure 3-4.  Total Number of PACs per Industry 
 
included in this measure, no industry representative PACs (such as the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the American Chemical Association, etc.) are included.  The 1971 Federal 
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Election Campaign Act (FECA) requires contribution disclosure for all candidates, political 
parties and political action committees.  In 1974, the Federal Election Committee (FEC) was 
established to oversee the campaign contribution process.  In 1976 PAC data became readily 
available and has been a primary measure of political influence ever since.  The average number 
of PACs per industry (excluding utilities) was 14.29 and the median (including utilities) found in 
the sample is 14.5 therefore, industries with 15 or more PACs are coded a high score of 1, while 
those industries with 14 or less PACs are coded a low score of 0 (see Figure 3-4). 
 
Registered Lobbyist 
Neustadtl (1990) defines political activities engaged in by corporations as an attempt to go 
further than gaining access to political leaders.  It is also to help shape the process by influencing 
the development of legislation.  Lobbyists must register with both the House and the Senate if 
they intend to influence specific legislation.  The 1946 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act 
requires that individuals paid to lobby on behalf of an organization must register quarterly 
financial reports with the clerk of the House and the secretary of the Senate.  Individuals that 
spend their own money are not required to register nor are individuals that are acting in an 
educational capacity rather than an advocacy position.  Grassroots lobbying  (letter writing and 
phone calls) activities do not require registration.23  A registered lobbyist is someone who is paid 
to lobby on behalf of an organization that intends to have direct contact with members of 
congress in order to secure something of value. 
 
                                                     
23 This will be discussed in the Chapter IV.  A large grassroots lobbying campaign was launched by the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the Business Industry PAC, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Business Round Table.  
However, this data is not included in my sample. 
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The construction of this measure is a count of the number of lobby registrants that 
appeared in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1979-1981 (CQA).  Registrations are included 
if they were specific to a firm within the sample, and if specifically mentioning either tax issues  
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Figure 3-5.  Industry Ratio of Registered Lobbyists per Firm 
 
or general firm representation (Congressional Quarterly 1979; Congressional Quarterly 1980).24  
The measure for registered lobbyists (REGLOBBY) is the number of registration appearances 
that occur in the CQA from January 1, 1979 through August 1981.  A threshold ratio of 1:1 
marks the data breakpoint.  Therefore, any industry that has a ratio of registered lobbyists to 
number of firms per industry greater than or equal to 1:1 is coded a high score of 1, and any 
industry that falls below the 1:1 ratio is coded a low score of  0 (Figure 3-5). 
 
 
                                                     
24 A few instances occurred when a firm was listed but other issues were identified as the purpose of the 
lobbyist.  Those cases were not included in this measure.   
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Washington Public Affairs Office 
The emergence of the public affairs office grew in response to 1960’s social reform legislation.  
It became increasingly clear to corporations that they needed to have access to political players 
as well as have an inside track into political affairs that would enable them to be more effective 
in promoting and stalling legislative efforts.  Vogel (1989: 197) reported that from 1968 to 1978 
the number of firms with public affairs offices in Washington increased from 100 to 500.  The 
overall increase of corporate presence in Washington D.C. was significant during this period.  
The business community recognized that in order to monitor and affect legislative events on a 
daily basis that a formal commitment to permanent Washington staff was critical.  The number 
of range of representation included: 
All told, as of 1980 there were in Washington 12,000 lawyers representing 
business before Federal regulatory agencies and the Federal courts, 9000 
business lobbyists, 50,000 trade-association personnel, 8,000 public relations 
specialists, 1300 public-affairs consultants, and 12,000 specialized journalists 
reporting to particular industries on government developments affecting them 
(Vogel 1989: 197-98).25 
  
Clearly, it had become an important component of corporate political strategy to have a 
presence on Capital Hill.  Data for this measure are from The National Directory of Corporate 
Public Affairs (Close 1983), simply recorded as the presence or absence of a Washington based 
office (WASHOFF).  Those firms with public affairs offices outside Washington, D.C. are not 
included in this measure.  It should be noted that this measure does not take into account the size, 
budget, or number of personnel in each office, but rather is simply a count of the number of 
industry firms that committed to a D.C. based office.  A clear break in the data occurs between 
the industries of Drugs (a score of 7) and General Manufacturing (a score of 10).  On average, 
 
                                                     
25 See Vogel (1989) for a intense look at the increase of business political behavior. 
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industries have 8.5 Washington D.C. offices during this period.  Any industry with nine or more 
Washington D.C. offices is coded a high score of 1 and those falling below nine per industry are 
coded a low score of 0 (see Figure 3-6).26 
WASHOFF per Industry
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Figure 3-6.  Total Number of Washington Offices per Industry 
 
Hired Gun 
The last political variable for consideration is the number of outside lobbyists hired by an 
industry (HIREDGUN).  A hired gun is an individual or firm separate from the corporation that 
acts on behalf of the firm or industry.  This measure is different from corporate registered 
lobbyists, who work solely within and for the corporation, because the commitment to hire an 
outside firm requires a strong desire to affect a particular piece of legislation beyond that goes 
beyond the skill or capacity of in-house advocates.  Rarely are outside firms hired to simply 
 
                                                     
26 This measure was not included in the final model. 
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monitor legislative issues.  A hired gun is a special kind of counsel that requires a significant 
investment in the political process and is not necessarily a regular or typical business activity.  
Data for this measure was gathered using the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (CQ 1979, 
1980, and 1981).  Hired lobbyist registrations appear as the lobby firm on behalf of the corporate 
organization and are separate from in-house lobbyists.  The ratio of hired guns per firm for the 
total set is 40% (see Figure 3-7).  Comparing each industry to the total, if an industry has a  
hiredgun to firm ratio of 40% or greater it is coded a high score of 1, and those industries falling 
below 40% are coded a low score of 0. 
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Figure 3-7.  Ratio of Outside Lobby Firms per Industry 
 
Structural Economic Factors 
The measures used to assess structural economic factors represent a serious departure from 
traditional measures.  Previously structural models posited industry rates of investment and 
industry levels of unemployment as key to policy change.  Neither measure reflects the 
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theoretical implication that the state acts on behalf of industry interests to support increased 
levels of capital accumulation and sustain political legitimacy.  More accurately, to adequately 
measure and assess the importance or strength of an industry within the overall economic system 
a number of measures must be included.  In this way, four measures of economic position were 
developed.  Three of these measures are new variable constructs.  Taking into consideration the 
various ways industry position could affect the overall economic system, similar to the manner 
in which Perrone (Perrone, Wright, and Griffin 1984)discusses strike capacity to disrupt 
economic production.  With this in mind the measures included address the relationship of an 
industry to the state and the overall economy:  1) Federal Government-Industry Dependence 
(FEDEP); 2) Industry contribution to the overall production economy (TOTALECO); and 3) 
Inter-industry dependence (INTERDEP), are highly interconnected, and/or that are major 
providers to the Federal Government.  The economic variables are all constructed using national 
level data, in order to represent the industry from which the firms belong.  This is different from 
the political data, which was collected at the firm level and then aggregated by industry.  Using 
the data in this manner was purposeful.  The intent was to assess the significance of a particular 
industry within the broader economy in relationship to their particular political behavior.  Since 
the largest firms are the most active politically, it is likely that even with the different levels of 
data, the sample represents the political strength of the entire industry as well as their economic 
position.  When lobbying, an organization will present their case in terms of the broader group 
for which they are associated.  For example, manufacturing firms advocate the position of the 
manufacturing industry and the impact that the industry has on the nation’s economic health, 
even if the provisions that they seek are of specific benefit to them personally.   
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Industry Input-Output Matrix 
It was necessary to develop a measurement tool for examining the dynamic economic 
relationships within and between industries.  Building on the concept of economic disruption 
used to measure union-strike threats (Perrone et al. 1984), I developed an industry production 
matrix from which three conceptually unique measures of economic performance in order to 
capture the structural interdependence among industries and the state.  The source for the 
aggregate industry level data was the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), which publishes inter-industry production, summarizing the use of commodities 
by industries (Young and Planting 1983). 
Using the 1979 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) industry/commodity tables, the 
value of commodity exchange between 77 industries, the state, Federal government and various 
miscellaneous commerce units (totaling 85 economic units) an input-output matrix was 
constructed (see Appendix E).  Each of the 77 industry segments are matched with the 18 
industry segments according to the corresponding 2-digit SIC (standardized industrial code) 
industry segments that are found in the original 1981 Fortune sample.  The 1981 Fortune 500 
and Fortune 300 lists does not consist of the same number of the industry segments as found in 
the BEA industry list; the input-output matrix maintained the BEA industry-use categories in 
order to minimize any data loss.  The matrix table is read both across each row and down each 
column.  The row data represents the value (in millions) of goods sold to the corresponding 
columnar industries.  The row total is the total commodity output for the industry.  The column 
(input) total is the total output consumed by the column industry.  This matrix was developed 
and used to measure inter-industry dependency, economic strength, and Federal–industry 
relationship variables.   
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 While rate of investment is a common measure used throughout the literature as the 
independent variable for state-structural response, there is reason to believe that investment and 
tax breaks are not associated in a meaningful manner.  In the mid-1970’s many industry 
associations “manufactured” economic reports that claimed tax breaks and investment incentives 
were necessary to stimulate growth (Chell 1981).  Stock market fluctuations and rates of 
investment are closely linked to interest rates, not tax rates. 
 
Inter-Industry Dependency 
In contrast to rate of investment, a traditional explanatory variable used in structural arguments, I 
propose that a more effective measure of economic importance is the number of inter-industry 
connections (INTERDEP) (see Figure 3-8).  Inter-industry connectedness is the degree to which 
one industry interacts with other industries.  The connection is important because if an industry 
fails, it can affect disrupt other industries both in terms of supplying and receiving goods.  The 
goal of this measure is to examine the broadest level of meaningful number of inter-industry 
connections.  Using the row total (total output per industry, see Appendix E), percentage output 
values are calculated for the 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5% levels; counting the total number of industry 
connections at each of these levels.  For example, the aerospace industry has a total output of just 
over $16 billion.  The corresponding figures for the 2-5% levels were $320 million, $480 
million, $640 million and $800 million, respectively27.  Aerospace has three inter-industry 
connections at each of the percentage thresholds.  Although aerospace is an industry with only a 
few meaningful connections, the few connections it has are very strong.  Compare this to general 
manufacturing, with 14 inter-industry connections at the 2%, but only seven inter-industry 
 
                                                     
27 All economic variables are expressed in millions. 
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connections at the 5% level.  This pattern of inter-industry connectivity was consistent 
throughout the sample.  The number of inter-industry connections dramatically drops at the 3% 
level and is virtually nonexistent at the 4% and 5% levels.  Because the goal of this measure is to 
capture the broadest number of inter-industry connections, the 2% level proved most effective.  
At this level, a clear differentiation is made between industries while maximizing the total 
number of inter-industry connections.  After setting the connection level, the threshold had to be  
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Figure 3-8.  Total Number of Inter-industry Connections  
  
established.  The average number of inter-industry connections per industry is 8.84.  A break in 
the data occurs at the 10 inter-industry connection level, and because this is consistent with a 95 
percent confidence level, the threshold was set at 10 or greater inter-industry connections.  Those 
industries with 10 or more inter-industry connections are coded a high score of 1, and those 
industries with nine or less inter-connections are coded a low score of 0 on INTERDEP.   
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Economic Structural Strength 
While an industry’s total contribution to the overall economy, posited by both class dominance 
and structuralist theory as vital for gaining state favor and policy consideration, structuralist 
theory holds that economic position alone should be positively related to policy outcome.  A 
measure of total economic worth for each industry was constructed from the input-output matrix 
(Appendix E).  The measure used for total economic strength (TOTALECO) is the industry 
percentage of total industry output (the row total divided by total economic production for each 
industry).  The average economic production level is 3.5% for the 18 industries identified in the 
sample.  With a 95 percent confidence-level, the threshold would be set at 4.2% industry-to-total 
economic production.  However, an apparent break in the data occurs at the mean.  Using the 
mean as the threshold encompassed a more representative set of industries.  Thus, industries that 
make up 3.5% or more of the total economy are coded a high score of 1, and those industries 
falling below 3.5% are coded a low score of 0 score (see Figure 3-9).   
TOTALECO per Industry
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Figure 3-9.  Industry Production as Percentage of Total Economic Production 
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Federal–Industry Relationship 
The last measure derived from the input-output matrix examines the relationship between the 
Federal government and a single industry (DEPFED).  Industries that rely on the Federal 
government as special consumer of their goods are more likely to have a strong relationship with 
the state.  For example, the aerospace industry supplies over 82% of its production to the  
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Figure 3-10.  Percentage of Industry Production Purchased by Federal Government28 
 
Federal government.  This makes the aerospace industry highly dependent on the Federal 
government, and vice versa.  The goods purchased from the aerospace industry cannot be found 
elsewhere in the economy.  Any industry for which the (see Figure 3-10) Federal Government 
 
                                                     
28 Aerospace (AERO) had a value of 82%, which exceeded the graph scale.   
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purchased over 3% of their total goods is coded a high score of 1, and each industry with less 
than 3% Federal purchase is coded low score of 0. 
 
Employment 
In addition to economic stability, the state is motivated to support high levels of employment.  
Rather than focusing on unemployment levels, a more accurate measure of employment strength  
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Figure 3-11.  Average Number of Employees per Industry 
 
is dictated by structural theory.  Therefore, employment rather than unemployment would be an 
industry characteristic that would predict state favor.  If structural theory is supported, the 
industries with the greatest number of workers should have lower effective tax levels.  While the 
average number of employees per industry is over 800,000, the data has a more natural break at 
the between 550,000 and 700,000 employees (see Figure 3-11).  Industries with an average of 
more than 600,000 workers per year are coded a score high of 1, and industries with less than 
599,000 or less are coded a low score of 0. 
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Sample and Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is industry.  The initial sample is comprised of the largest corporations (in 
terms of assets) identified in the Fortune Industrial 500 and Fortune Service 300 lists for 1981, 
aggregated by industry.  Each firm was aggregated according to the standard industrial code 
(SIC code discussed below) that corresponds to the primary industry segment within which the 
corporation operates.  This was the basis of the sample construction.   
The privileged economic position of these corporate organizations serves as the basis for 
group participation(Caporaso and Levine 1992).29  Previous research (Galaskiewicz 1985; 1987; 
Mizruchi 1989a; 1989b; Useem 1984; Whitt 1982) found that corporate leaders align their 
political behavior with similar corporations.  Thus the likelihood that corporations within similar 
industries will act in similar manner is great, as demonstrated by Mizruchi’s (1989a; 1989b)work 
on similarity of PAC involvement.  Industries are often subject to similarities in plant, employee, 
technology` demands, and market conditions.30  
 In the case of tax policy, the tax code itself has special provisions for particular 
industries such as oil and gas, real estate, and financial institutions.  It was reported in Business 
Week that the industries slated to “win from the pending (1981) tax legislation would be steel, 
utilities, cement, and railroads as well as petroleum refining “ (1979a: 116).  Even in light of 
what are viewed as general business lobbies such as the Business Round Table, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, or the Chamber of Commerce, individual industries were also 
engaged in political behavior aimed at getting tax breaks that would suit their particular needs. 
 
                                                     
29 Selective incentives and coercion are also listed by Caporaso and Levine (1992) as motivations for group 
participation. 
30 Free-riders (Olson 1965) are not a concern addressed in this study.  I assume that corporations are unified  on 
by interest and industry structure.  Membership in the industry is determined by economic similarity of industry 
structure.   
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 The selection of industry as the unit of analysis provides a basis for evaluating 
differences between economic segments.  Industries vary by degree of economic strength, 
coordination and similarity.  This research explores the causal conditions in which industries are 
able to effect policy change and take advantage of the subsequent advantages in the outcome of 
that policy as well as the conditions under which industries engage in political activities to 
achieve their goal or maintain their status.  Salamon and Siegfried (1977b) stressed the 
importance of developing empirical tests of economic structure and political influence.  They 
posited that, “whatever relationship exists between economic structure and political influence in 
general should be evident in variations among industries in securing public policies favorable to 
them” (Salamon and Siegfried 1977b) (emphasis added). 
 Classwide unity is not the underlying assumption.  The models tested utilize industry as 
the unit of analysis because industries are comprised of firms with similar organizational 
constraints and demands from the broad political-economic environment.  This approach 
provides a basis for comparison that reaches beyond firm level analysis or broad national 
industry classifications.  Firm level data lacks a solid basis for comparison and national industry 
aggregated data fails to differentiate types or levels of organization.  If all industries behavior in 
a similar manner or have similar outcomes regardless of their political behavior or economic 
position, then the conclusion would be that industry classification is not useful.  However, 
industry differences are apparent from the onset.  Failure to differentiate industries segments 
obfuscates the different patterns of economic and political behavior that are associated with tax 
policy outcomes.  Salamon and Siegfried (1977b) observed that if industry behavior is not taken 
into account, some outcomes might be inappropriately attributed to all industries.  Business as a 
single unit of interest limits the understanding of the inner dynamics of business.  Moving 
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beyond the notion of business as simply a monolithic interest provides opportunities for analysis 
that can address more complex issues than simply business versus labor.31 
 In 1981, the determination of industry classification reflected the primary area of 
business within which they operated as well as specific types of product lines; every firm has an 
assigned Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.32  The SIC code distinguishes firms by 
industry segment or major group (2-digit) and product line (3 and 4-digit) classifications.  Using 
industry segment as the unit of analysis meant that the most appropriate SIC classification would 
be the 2-digit SIC code for primary industry segment.  This reflects the major or broad industry 
segment in which the corporation operates.  The initial 1981 Fortune sample had 35 distinct 
industry segments, ultimately collapsed into 18 industry categories.   
 The 1981 Fortune Industrial 500 and Service 300 (Fortune 1982)firms were included in 
the study if they met three basic criteria.  First, the firm had to be on the Fortune 1981 lists of 
largest U.S. corporations.  Second, a minimum of 10 firms from each industry had to remain in 
the sample (if less than 10 firms were present then an effort was made to incorporate them into a 
related area) for the industry to be included in the final analysis.  The political data did not 
restrict the sample.  Since Compustat was used to supply the dependent variable, data was 
limited to those firms with complete tax and income data for each of the years included in the 
study. 
 The third and final criteria for inclusion in the final sample, was the industry had to 
show a net profit for the three years prior to passage of the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act 
 
                                                     
31 Variability also exists within labor and therefore should be treated as unique segments of the economic sector.  
Union sectors versus nonunion sectors may benefit differently from different labor initiatives.  To claim labor as a 
universal condition is also limiting.  
32 Today the SIC classification has been replaced with the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS).  While there is some similarities, the NAICS classifications are more specific.  
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Table 3-2.  Industry Segment Descriptions 
 
Industry Segment Description 
Aerospace (AERO) Aircraft and parts. 
Automotive (AUTO) Motor vehicles and equipment; other transportation equipment. 
Chemical (CHEM) Chemicals and selected chemical products, paints and allied products. 
Diversified Financial (DFIN) Finance and insurance. 
Drugs, Hospital Supply, and Leisure 
(DRUGS) Drugs, cleaning and toilet preparations. 
Electrical and Electronics (ELEC) 
Electrical transmission and distribution equipment 
and industrial apparatus; household appliances, 
electrical lighting and wiring equipment, radio, 
television, and communication equipment, 
electronic components and accessories; and 
miscellaneous equipment and supplies. 
Fabricated Metal Products, except 
machinery and transportation equipment 
(FABMETAL); 
Heating, plumbing, and fabricated structural metal 
products, screw machine products and stampings, 
other fabricated metal products. 
Food, Beverage and Tobacco (FOOD) Food and kindred products, tobacco manufacturers. 
Rubber, Plastics, Stone and Glass 
(RUBBER) 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products, plastics 
and synthetic materials. 
Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling 
Instruments:  photographic, medical, 
watches, clocks and computers (MEAS) 
Office, computing, and accounting machines, 
service industry machines. 
Oil, Gas, Mining and Pipelines 
(OIL&GAS) 
Crude petroleum and natural gas, petroleum 
refining and related industries. 
Paper and Allied Products (PAPER) Paper and allied products, except containers and boxes, paperboard containers and boxes. 
Printing and Publishing (PRINT) Printing and publishing. 
Retail and Service Trade (RETAIL) Wholesale and retail trade. 
Textiles (TEXTILE) 
Broad and narrow fabrics, yarn and thread mills, 
Miscellaneous textile goods and floor coverings, 
apparel, miscellaneous fabricated textile products. 
Transportation (TRANS) Transportation and warehousing. 
Utilities (UTIL) Electric, gas, water and sanitary services, communication other than radio and television. 
(Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis:  Summary Input-Output Tables of the U.S. Economy:  
1976, 1978, and 1979.) 
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 (1979-1981) and the three years after the passage of the bill (1982-1984).  While the first two 
criteria are concerned with the validity of the study, the third criteria addresses tax computation.  
It is impossible to calculate an outcome for effective tax rate if each component of the equation 
is a negative value.  The result of this calculation would be a positive effective tax rate 
(negative/negative), and therefore an illogical outcome.  It is for this reason that the industry, 
primary metal was eliminated from the sample.  The three eliminated industries, in addition to 
other cases wherein the financial data was unavailable or incomplete, reduced the final sample 
size to 368 firms that were represented by 18 industries (Table 3-2).  In the 18 industries 
included in the sample, 16 industries experienced less than 50% loss of firms per industry.  
However, two industries, transportation and diversified financials, however, respectively lost 
72% and 76% of their original industry sample.
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
Overview 
Corporate demand, public sentiment and legislative response to anemic economic growth, rising 
inflation and national industrial crises set the stage for the passage of the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA81).  In this chapter, I will present the findings from a qualitative 
comparative analysis of the outcome variable, tax change, in relationship to both structural 
economic and political behavior variables for each of 18 industries using three models of the 
dependent variable across three types of analysis (economic, political and combined political-
economic).  Separate analyses of both the political and economic variables as well as a separate 
analysis combining the variables allowed for the examination of the utility of the exclusive 
variable analysis versus the combined analysis.  The combined analysis demonstrates that the 
interaction between both the political and economic variables provides a more thorough 
explanation than the separate models.  The utility of the exclusive political and economic 
analyses are limited due to the excessive number of contradictory rows (discussed below), while 
the combined analysis was free of any contradictions and provides a more precise explanation of 
the causal conditions related to reduction of effective tax rates.   
 
Three Models of the Dependent Variable 
Each analysis (economic, political and combined) was conducted using three models of the 
dependent variable.  The three dependent variable models result from an examination of industry 
tax status.  The raw data clearly indicates that there are several forms that tax status could take:  
1) Eight industries were able to achieve the desired 5% or greater reduction in effective tax rate; 
2) Seven industries had tax rates for both periods that fell below 20%; and 3) Six industries 
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failed to either reduce their tax 5% or greater, or have historically low tax rates.  This led three 
separate models of the dependent variable.  Each variable is discussed using the variable 
acronym and a particular model of the dependent variable (Models 1, 2 and 3).  The 
capitalization of an item (i.e., TOTALECO or TAXCHANGE) indicates the high score for each 
of these particular measures.  If an item appears in lowercase letters, (i.e., taxchange) it 
represents a weak or low score on that particular measure.  The first model (Model 1) compares 
18 industries on their ability to achieve the desired 5% or greater reduction in effective taxes 
(TAXCHANGE).33  The second model (Model 2) combines industries that achieve the desired tax 
change (TAXCHANGE) with four industries that have historically low effective tax rates but did 
not achieve the desired tax change (HISTLOW/taxchange).  The dependent variable for Model 2 
is noted as: TAXCHANGE/HISTLOW.  The third model of the dependent variable (Model 3) 
removes the four HISTLOW/taxchange industries, and compares only those industries that are 
TAXCHANGE and taxchange/histlow.  The use of these three models provides insight on matters 
concerning change in tax rates and the conditions that are associated with tax change rather than 
tax change and historically low status.  The data clearly indicate that the HISTLOW/taxchange 
industries create conflicts and reduce the ability to clearly analyze the relationship between 
economic and political variables and tax change.  For example, utilities is an industry with a 
historical effective tax rate that is very low year in and year out; it was an industry that 
participated heavily in the political process as well as having strong economic ties that were not 
based solely on a relationship with the Federal government.  Examining the contradictions for 
 
                                                     
33 Please note that any discussion of variables wherein an acronym is used a term in ALL CAPS is the high or 
strong value on the measure, and  all-lower-case term represents a low score for that measure. 
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both the economic and political analyses describes those industries not clearly differentiated by 
an exclusive variable approach (discussed later in this chapter).   
 
Correlation Analysis 
Table 4-1 presents the correlation statistics for industry structural economic position and political 
behaviors associated with the dependent variable change in average industry effective tax rate 
(TAXCHANGE = greater than 5% change in effective tax rate).  All variables were coded “1” or 
“0” for each measure, including the dependent variable.  Note that correlations for both the 
number of employees and the presence of a Washington D.C. office are weak in all three models.  
In fact, the number of employees has a weak negative relationship to the dependent variable in 
Models 2 and 3.  This is contrary to what is expected. 
 Total economic worth (TOTALECO) presented a weak negative relationship to the 
dependent variable in Model 1 (-0.13), but responds positively to the recoding of the dependent 
variable in Model 2.  Removing industries with historically low tax rates but not tax change 
(Model 3) weakened the correlation between TOTALECO and TAXCHANGE.  This supports the 
idea that TOTALECO has more in common with the HISTLOW/taxchange industries than either 
the TAXCHANGE or taxchange only industries.   
 The level of Federal-industry interaction (DEPFED) declines from Model 1 to Model 2 
and then increases again in Model 3.  This result is due to the fact the eight TAXCHANGE 
industries had strong relationships with the Federal government, while the four industries 
included in Model 2 (HISTLOW/taxchange) had weaker associations with DEPFED than did 
TAXCHANGE industries.  Overall, the level of Federal purchases within an industry had a 
relatively strong correlation with a positive tax policy outcome.  The correlations for all four 
political behavior variables increases in Models 2 and 3; the strongest correlation is associated 
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with directed political campaign contributions in Model 3 (.75).  The other directed political 
strongest correlations are associated with Federal-industry relations and directed political 
campaign funds (DEPFED 0.58, and PACFUND 0.55).  In Model 2, the DEPFED correlation 
 
Table 4-1.  Correlation Table:  Independent Variables for Each of Three Dependent Variables 
 
Independent Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 1 
N=18 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 2 
N=18 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 3 
N=14 
DEPFED 
r2 
0.58 
(0.33) 
0.32 
(0.10) 
0.56 
(0.31) 
TOTALECO 
r2 
-0.13 
(0.02) 
0.40 
(0.16) 
0.23 
(0.05) 
INTERDEP 
r2 
0.10 
(0.01) 
0.40 
(0.16) 
0.34 
(0.12) 
PACFUND 
r2 
0.55 
(0.30) 
0.63 
(0.40) 
0.75 
(0.56) 
REGLOBBY 
r2 
0.25 
(0.06) 
0.40 
(0.16) 
0.42 
(0.17) 
HIREDGUN 
r2 
0.35 
0.12 
0.55 
0.31 
0.58 
0.33 
NUMPAC 
r2 
0.22 
(0.05) 
0.24 
(0.06) 
0.29 
(0.08) 
Independent Variables 
Removed from the Analysis    
EMPLOYEE 
r2 
0.13 
(0.02) 
-0.16 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
WASHOFF 
r2 
0.13 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.13 
(0.02) 
 
Model 1:  Dependent Variable: TAXCHANGE.  All industries that achieved a reduction in average 
effective tax rate of 5% or greater were coded “1”.  If an industry fell below 5%, it was coded “0”.  
 
Model 2:  Dependent Variable: TAXCHANGE/HISTLOW.  If an industry has a historically low tax rate 
(20% or lower for both periods) and has and/or has achieved the desired reduction in effective tax rate 
of 5% or greater it was coded “1” and if it was only taxchange it was coded  “0”.   
 
Model 3: Dependent Variable = TAXCHANGE.  If an industry achieved a reduction in average effective 
tax rate of more than 5%.  The four taxchange/HISTLOW industries those that were historically low but 
did not achieve the 5% or greater change in effective tax rate, were removed from the sample.  
Otherwise, coding was the same as Model 1. 
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activity is associated with the hiring of outside representation.  This measure also has a moderate 
association with the dependent variable.  In Model 1, the declines when three of the four 
historically low industries added to the “winner” category do not receive high scores on 
DEPFED.  However, the correlations for all remaining variables increase (TOTALECO, 
INTERDEP, PACFUND, REGLOBBY, HIREDGUN, and NUMPAC) were moderately positive 
scores.  In Model 3, the three strongest correlations are:  PACFUND (.0.75), HIREDGUN 
(0.58), and DEPFED (0.56).  Correlations associated with total economic strength 
(TOTALECO) and number of inter-industry connections (INTERDEP) declines from Model 2 to 
Model 3, while the level of Federal-industry dependence (DEPFED) returns to a similar 
correlation level as found in Model 1.  Most of the correlations are not extremely strong 
throughout each of the models, and small sample size renders statistical significance difficult to 
obtain, resulting in very low statistical power.  However, the variables included in the final 
analysis have at least a moderate correlation with the dependent variable and merit examination. 
In an attempt to establish an empirical basis from which to construct the independent 
variables, use of correlation analysis provided basis for variable inclusion.  A correlation of 0.29 
or higher was set as the threshold for variable inclusion.  These two variables, EMPLOYEE and 
WASHINGTON OFFICE, fail to meet the inclusion criteria and therefore were removed from 
the final qualitative comparative analysis.  The fact that employment is not significant this is 
especially surprising.  The largest industry employers did not consistently benefit from the 
change in tax law; in fact, it was associated with a weak negative effect.  In a similar manner, the 
presence of an office in Washington D.C. did not even remotely affect the likelihood of reducing 
industry effective tax rates.  The seven independent variables (PACFUND, REGLOBBY, 
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HIREDGUN, NUMPAC, DEPFED, TOTALECO, and INTERDEP) were used to assess the 
causal conditions associated with tax winners.34 
 Separating the dependent variable into three distinct measures (labeled Models 1, 2, and 
3) insures that the complexity of the dependent variable relating to historical trends and historical 
winners is accounted for separate from the ability to significantly reduce effective tax rates 
through a legislative vehicle.  Because the intent of this study is to examine change in industry 
effective tax rates, using Models 1 and 3, controls for those industries that are “winners” 
historically, but significantly change their status during this period.  The final discussion centers 
on Model 3, since it separates the analysis to just winners and non-winners.   
 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis:  Results 
Although not required by qualitative comparative analysis, the correlation analysis shed light on 
the relative value of each independent variable.  One of the primary goals of this study is to 
examine the complex economic and political relationships associated with tax policy and tax 
policy outcomes using Boolean techniques facilitated with qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA).  It is not necessary to use correlation analysis when conducting a Boolean analysis.  In 
fact, when using a correlation measure to assess the relationship between variables, one might 
directed to drop many of the variables due to their limited association with the dependent 
variable.   
Because the capacity of QCA is to assess complex, varied causal conditions, the 
limitations of standard statistical analysis need not apply.  However, as a tool, the correlation  
 
                                                     
34 As discussed earlier, it is difficult to classify the industry samples as “losing” since none of them paid the 
maximum level of tax, and only one industry paid above 35%.  Comparably they did “less well.” 
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Table 4-2.  Raw Data Truth Table 
 
Independent Variables 
INDUSTRY 
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(H
IS
TL
O
W
 
R
EM
O
V
ED
) 
N
=1
4 
GENMAN 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
AUTO 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DFIN 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
FABMET 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
CHEM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
OIL&GAS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AERO 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
DRUG 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
TRANS 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 OMIT 
RETAIL 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UTIL 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 OMIT 
MEAS 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
TEXTILE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PRINT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ELEC 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
FOOD 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
PAPER 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 OMIT 
RUBBER 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 OMIT 
 
analysis provides some idea of how strong the correlate relationships are between the 
independent and dependent variable.  Because a number of the measures that I have developed 
and incorporated into my analysis are new, and since it is impossible to determine statistical 
strength from QCA, the correlation analysis serves to provide critical assessment as to the 
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necessity or utility of a measure.  Contradictions, or contradictory statements, arise when 
identical causal sets have different outcomes.  The series of prime expressions use the logic 
terms of AND (noted by the use of  *) and OR (noted by the use of +) are used to indicate 
Boolean algebraic multiplication and addition processes, respectively.  The causal set notation is 
characterized through the capitalized of items that score high and the use of lower case notation 
for those items that score low on each particular measure (e.g., DEPFED and depfed).35 
 Table 4-2 summarizes the raw data truth table detailing the various causal sets for three 
variations of the dependent variable TAXCHANGE.  Preliminary examination of the data 
suggested that the dependent variable (TAXCHANGE) was complicated by those industries with 
historically low effective tax rates but unable to further reduce their tax rate by the 5%.  This led 
to the conclusion that the analysis must take into account the historically low industries (those 
industries with average effective tax rates below 20% for both periods) by either incorporating 
them into an overall “winner” classification or eliminating them from the analysis.  
 
Three Separate Analysis:  Economic, Political, and Combined 
In order demonstrate the impact of the different explanations; separate QCA analyses were 
conducted for both the political and economic variables on all three models.  Following the 
economic and political models was an analysis of the combined model.  The result, was a more 
complete and definitive explanation of industry power; the result of an interaction of various 
forms of political and economic characteristics.  The fact that past research has focused 
 
                                                     
35 Throughout the discussion of variables and models, capital letters denote a strong condition, and lowercase 
letters denote a weak condition.  The models relate to the three forms of the dependent variable used in this study.  
When findings are simplified they are represented in notion format.  For example, if strong federal relationship, weak 
total economic, and strong inter-industry conditions are found, it would be noted as DtI.   
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exclusive theoretical or variable-oriented approaches has lead to a discounting of the interaction 
between structural position in conjunction with directed political behavior that leads to power 
and ultimately benefit from the state.  Together the integrated approach informs us about the 
causal conditions that determine “who wins” from “who plays.” 
Contradictions or contradictory rows result when identical causal sets have different 
outcomes.  Ragin (1987) suggests several solutions to overcome contradictions.  The first is to 
return to the theory to identify another cause yet unidentified.  The second approach is to 
disregard cases that have too few occurrences.  A third approach allows for the recoding of items 
depending on the tendency of the cases (for example if 15 out of 16 cases had positive outcomes 
and only one case had a negative outcome, it is feasible that the causal set would be considered a 
positive outcome).  When this third approach is taken the causal set is no longer has a certain 
outcome and must then be considered only “likely.”  When contradictory rows are included with 
certain rows, then the outcomes are only “possible.”  In this analysis, only certain outcomes 
(positive and negative) were considered.  The expressed contradictions in the limited models 
(economic or political variables only) are so severe that it is clear that other explanations 
(variables) are contributing to the outcome.  The combined analysis highlights the importance of 
an interaction between economic condition and political behavior in a manner that has not been 
demonstrated prior to this study.  
 
Structural Economic Causal Conditions 
Structural economic variables examine the degree to which economic position affects industry 
power.  The notation for the economic analysis is: 
TAXCHANGE = DEPFED*TOTALECO*INTERDEP 
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DEPFED, TOTALECO, and INTERDEP are three unique and conceptually important economic 
measures.  The first variable, DEPFED, measures the Federal Government’s demand for goods 
from a particular industry.  Of the eight industries that achieved greater than 5% reduction in 
effective tax rate (Model 1), seven scored high on DEPFED, while only three of the ten 
taxchange industries scored high on this measure.  The second measure, TOTALECO, measures 
industry production as a percentage of total production.  Only three “winner” industries scored 
high on this measure.  However, all four of the HISTLOW/taxchange industries scored high on 
this measure.  The third measure, INTERDEP, measures the number of inter-industry 
connections.  Four of the eight “winning” industries scored high on this measure, as did three of 
the HISTLOW/taxchange industries. 
 Table 4-3 lists the raw data matrix for these three variables.36  For Models 1 and 2, there 
are eight outcomes or rows (which is equal to the total possible number of outcomes 23) and for 
Model 3 there are seven outcomes.37  Model 1 has two contradictory rows, accounting for eight 
of the 18 rows (five of which are associated with “1” or positive outcomes and three of which are 
associated with “0” or negative outcomes).  Model 2 has three contradictory rows, accounting for 
10 of the 18 cases.  Model 3 has one contradictory row, comprising 5 of 14 cases.  The causal 
combinations represent the actual cases found in the data set, for which “1” outputs are reduced 
to a “partially reduced sum-of-products equation” and then further reduced using prime 
implicants (Ragin 1987:108). 
  
 
 
                                                     
36 The truth table is the raw data matrix expression of the algebraic combinations of causal sets.  Each row 
represents a possible outcome and combination of outcomes for each of the independent variables.   
37 The term outcome refers to the number of rows in the truth table.    
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Table 4-3.  Truth Table:  Economic Causal Conditions for Three Models 
 
Model 1 
N=18 
DTI=TAXCHANGE 
Case Frequency 
Model 2 
N=18 
DTI=TAXCHANGE/HISTLOW 
Case Frequency 
Model 3 
N=14 
DTI=TAXCHANGE 
Case Frequency 
Case 1 0 Case 1 0 Case 1 0 
1011 1 0 1011 1 0 1011 1 0 
100C 3 2 100C 3 2 100C 3 2 
0011 1 0 0011 1 0 0011 1 0 
1101 1 0 1101 1 0 1101 1 0 
111C 2 1 1111 3 0 1111 2 0 
0110 0 3 011C 2 1 0110 0 1 
0000 0 2 0000 0 2 0000 0 2 
0100 0 2 010C 1 1 0100 0 1 
Minimized Outputs: Certain “1” Outcomes 
 
totaleco*INTERDEP + 
DEPFED*TOTALECO*interdep 
 
1011 and 0011 = tI               
(GENMAN & DFIN) 
 
1101 = DTi 
(FABMET) 
 
 
DEPFED*INTERDEP   + 
DEPFED*TOTALECO   + 
totaleco*INTERDEP + 
 
1011 and 1111 = DI 
(GENMAN, CHEM, OIL, TRANS) 
 
1101 and 111 = DT 
(FABMET, CHEM, OIL, TRANS) 
 
1011 and 0011 = tI 
(GENMAN, DFIN) 
 
DEPFED*INTERDEP   + 
DEPFED*TOTALECO   + 
totaleco*INTERDEP 
 
1011 and 1111 = DI 
(GENMAN, CHEM, OIL) 
 
1111 and 1101 = DT 
(CHEM, OIL, FABMET) 
 
1011 and 0011 = tI 
(GENMAN & DFIN) 
8 Contradictions 
 
100C (5): MEAS, ELEC, AUTO, 
AERO, DRUGS; and 
111C (3): TRANS, CHEM, OIL, 
10 Contradictions 
 
100C (5): MEAS, ELEC, AUTO, 
AERO, DRUGS; 
011C (3): RETAIL, RUBBER, 
UTIL; and 
010C (2): FOOD, PAPER 
5 Contradictions 
 
100C (5):  MEAS, ELEC, AUTO, 
AERO, DRUGS 
 
Minimized Outputs – Certain “0” Outcomes 
depfed*TOTALECO  + 
depfed*interdep depfed*totaleco*interdep 
depfed*TOTALECO  + 
depfed**interdep 
0110 and 0100 = dT 
(retail, rubber, util and food, 
paper) 
 
0000 and 0100 = di 
(food, paper and text, print) 
0000 = dti 
(text, print) 
0110 and 0100 = dT 
(retail and food) 
 
0000 and 0100 = di 
(text, print, food) 
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There are three certain cases in Model 1 (no contradictory statements exists).  These three 
statements can be further reduced (to their simplest expression of prime implicants) with causal 
set statements representing:  1) cases in which total economic strength is weak (totaleco) but the 
number of inter-industry connections is high (INTERDEP) which is represented as tI; and 2) 
cases in which both Federal-industry (DEPFED) and total economic strength (TOTALECO) are 
high in the presence of a low number of inter-industry connections (interdep), represented as 
DTi.  Model 2 and Model 3, produced identical certain causal sets, although Model 2 has ten 
contradictions whereas in Model 3 the contradictions are reduced to five.  The reduction in 
contradictions occurs because of the elimination of the four HISTLOW/taxchange industries.  
The causal sets that emerged with these two models indicate that when: 1) Federal-industry 
dependence (DEPFED) and total economic strength (TOTALECO) were high, represented as 
DT; 2) Federal-industry dependence (DEPFED) and number of inter-industry connections 
(INTERDEP) were high, represented as DI; and 3) when total economic strength was low 
(totaleco), inter-industry connections were high (INTERDEP), represented as tI.  Both of these 
models, like Model 1, suffered from many contradictions.  The significant number of 
contradictions leads to the conclusion that by itself, structural measures of industry 
interconnectedness do not present as an adequate causal set associated with tax benefit.   
 Economic causal conditions that resulted in unsuccessful outcomes (“0”) represent 
instances in which industries were unable to achieve the desired change in effective tax rate.  In 
each of these causal sets the consistent, or necessary factor is weak a Federal-industry 
relationship.  While this factor is not in itself sufficient to explain failure, the data suggest that a 
weak State (Federal-level) relationship contributes to an unsuccessful outcome.  The opposite 
conclusion, however, associating DEPFED with a “1” outcome cannot be made from the data. 
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Industry Political Behavior - Causal Conditions 
The political causal sets present stronger links between political behavior and tax policy 
outcomes (Table 4-4).  Strong political behavior is apparent in actions directed at key 
congressional members.  Positive outcomes associated with each of the three models possess a 
consistent pattern of direct political influence (comprised of political campaign contributions to 
members of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees (PACFUND), a high 
number of registered lobbyists (REGLOBBY), and a high number of lobby firms (HIREDGUN) 
with both high and low number of PACs).  In Model 1, three out of eight industries are 
represented by the single certain positive “0” outcome PHRn.  In Model 3, six out of eight 
industries are represented by a single causal set, PHRN.  This represents a case in which all four 
of the political variables are strong.  In Model 1, when all four political measures are strong, five 
contradictory cases result (three positive outcomes and two negative outcomes).  These 
contradictions involve industries (utilities and paper) that have a tax status   HISTLOW/ 
taxchange.  The other row contradiction in Model 1 occurs when the variables pacfund, reglobby 
and hiredgun are all weak while the numpac is high.  This contradiction exists in all three 
dependent variable models and involves two “winning” industries (general manufacturing and 
fabricated metals) and one “unsuccessful” industry (food).   
 In Model 2, a new contradiction emerges for the row associated with all low scores on 
all political measures, this results from the shift of Rubber/Stone/Cement to a “winning” case.  
The unsuccessful cases in all three models share a common factor; each has a low score on 
directed campaign contributions (pacfund).  It should also be noted, that the greatest frequency 
of failure was associated with those industries that scored low on all four political measures 
(phrn).   
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Table 4-4.  Truth Table:  Political Causal Conditions for Three Models 
 
Model 1 
N=18 
PRHN=TAXCHANGE 
Model 2 
N=18 
PRHN=TAXCHANGE/HISTLOW 
Model 3 
N=14 
PRHN=TAXCHANGE 
Case 1 0 Case 1 0 Case 1 0 
0001C 2 1 0001C 2 1 0001C 2 1 
1111C 3 2 11111 5 0 11111 3 0 
11101 3 0 11101 3 0 11101 3 0 
01100 0 1 01101 1 0 - - - 
00000 0 4 0000C 1 3 00000 0 3 
01000 0 1 01000 0 1 01000 0 1 
01110 0 1 01110 0 1 01110 0 1 
Minimized Outputs:  Certain “1” Outcomes 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
PACFUND*REGLOBBY* 
HIREDGUN*numpac 
11101= PRHn 
(DFIN, AERO, DRUGS) 
 
 
PACFUND*REGLOBBY* 
HIREDGUN + 
REGLOBBY*HIREDGUN*numpac 
11111 and 11101 = PRH 
(AUTO, CHEM, OIL, UTIL, 
PAPER, DFIN, AERO, DRUGS) 
 
11101 = RHn 
(DFIN, AERO, DRUGS, TRANS) 
PACFUND*REGLOBBY* 
HIREDGUN*NUMPAC 
1111 and 11101 = PRHN 
(AUTO, CHEM, OIL, DFIN, 
AERO, DRUGS) 
 
8 Contradictions 
 
0001C (3): FOOD, GENMAN, 
FABMETAL; and 
 
1111C (5): UTIL, PAPER, 
AUTO, CHEMICAL, OIL 
7 Contradictions 
 
0001C (3): FOOD, GENMAN, 
FABMET; and 
 
0000C (4): RETAIL, TEXTILES, 
PRINT, RUBBER 
3 Contradictions 
 
0001C (3): FOOD, GENMAN, 
FABMETAL 
Minimized Outputs:  Certain “ 0” (unsuccessful) Outcomes  
pacfund*REGLOBBY* 
HIREDGUN+ 
pacfund*REGLOBBY*numpac 
+ 
pacfund*hiredgun*numpac 
0111 and 0110 = pRH 
(electrical and tran) 
0110 and 0100 = pRn 
(tran and measure) 
0000 and 0100 = phn 
(retail, rub, text, print and 
meas) 
pacfund*REGLOBBY* 
HIREDGUN*NUMPAC + 
pacfund*REGLOLBBY* 
hiredgun*numpac 
0111 = pRHN 
(electrical) 
0100 = pRhn 
(measurement) 
pacfund*hiredgun*numpac + 
pacfund*REGLOBBY*HIREDGUN 
NUMPAC 
0000 and 0100 = phn 
(retail, text, print and measure) 
0111 = pRHN 
(electrical) 
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Causal Variables 
Table 4-5 presents the complete set of causal conditions as they relate to effective tax rate 
outcomes.  No contradictory rows exist in the 14 case rows identified for either Model 1 (18 
industries) or Model 2  (14 industries).  This data is gathered from the raw data truth table, which 
as you recall represents the actual causal combinations found in the 18-industry sample.  The 
total number of possible logical combinations would be 27 (or 128 possible combinations). Five 
prime, or certain, expressions result from the reduction or simplification of causal statements 
associated with a positive outcome.  The combined analysis creates causal sets that include 
specific patterns of economic and political strength as associated with a reduction in effective tax 
rate of five percent or greater (TAXCHANGE).  Models 1 and 3 produce a similar picture of the 
causal sets affecting tax policy outcome.  Model 2 is helpful, to the extant that it reinforces the 
complexity of the dependent variable as associated with historical trends in tax favor.  The 
HISTLOW/taxchange industries have causal sets that resemble both winning and losing 
industries and therefore confound the clarity of the analysis between winners and losers, because 
they have both a winning history and a current losing status for tax change.  By recoding these 
items (Model 2), the conflated relationships are exposed.  It was for this reason that the four 
industries that represent HISTLOW/taxchange industries were removed from the analysis.  From 
this point forward the discussion will be limited to Models 1 and 3, for Model 2, while effective 
in clarifying the role of HISTLOW/taxchange industries, is no longer pertinent to the discussion 
at this time.  The relationship between economic and political variables is especially striking in 
Model 3.38   
 
 
                                                     
38 This model excludes four industries (HISTLOW/taxchange) from the analysis.   
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Table 4-5.  Truth Table:  Combined Causal Conditions for Three Models 
 
Model 1 
Frequency 
Model 2 
Frequency 
Model 3 
Frequency 
Case 1 0 Case 1 0 Case 1 0 
10100011 
(GENMAN) 1 0 
10100011 
(GENMAN) 1 0 
10100011 
(GENMAN) 1 0 
10011111 
(AUTO) 1 0 
10011111 
(AUTO) 1 0 
10011111 
(AUTO) 1 0 
00111101 
(DFIN) 1 0 
00111101 
(DFIN) 1 0 
00111101 
(DFIN) 1 0 
11000011 
(FABMET) 2 0 
11000011 
(FABMET) 1 0 
11000011 
(FABMET) 1 0 
11111111 
(CHEM)  
(OIL) 
2 0 
11111111 
(CHEM)  
(OIL) 
2 0 
11111111 
(CHEM)  
(OIL) 
2 0 
10011101 
(AERO)  
(DRUGS) 
2 0 
10011101 
(AERO)  
(DRUGS) 
2 0 
10011101 
(AERO)  
(DRUGS) 
2 0 
11101100 
(TRANS) 0 1 
11101101 
(TRANS) 1 0 - - - 
01100000 
(RETAIL)  
(RUBBER) 
0 2 
0110000C 
(RETAIL) 
(RUBBER) 
1 1 01100000 (RETAIL) 0 1 
01111110 
(UTIL) 0 1 
01111111 
(UTIL) 1 0 - - - 
10010000 
(MEAS) 0 1 
10001000 
(MEAS) 0 1 
10010000 
(MEAS) 0 1 
00000000 
(TEXT)  
(PRINT) 
0 2 
00000000 
(TEXT)  
(PRINT) 
0 2 
00000000 
(TEXT)  
(PRINT) 
0 2 
1000110 
(ELEC) 0 1 
10001110 
(ELEC) 0 1 
10001110 
(ELEC) 0 1 
01000010 
(FOOD) 0 1 
01000010 
(FOOD) 0 1 
01000010 
(FOOD) 0 1 
01011110 
(PAPER) 0 1 
01011111 
(PAPER) 1 0 - - - 
 Total  Total  Total 
 8 10  12 6  8 6 
Certain “1” Outcomes 
Model 1 
And 
Model 3 
 
DEPFED*totaleco*interdep*PACFUND*REGLOBBY*HIREDGUN  + 
DEPFED*TOTALECO*INTERDEP*PACFUND*REGLOBBY*HIREDGUN*NUMPAC  + 
depfed*totaleco*INTERDEP*PACFUND*REGLOBBY*HIREDGUN*numpac  + 
DEPFED*totaleco*INTERDEP*pacfund*reglobby*hiredgun*NUMPAC  + 
DEPFED*TOTALECO*interdep*pacfund*reglobby*hiredgun*NUMPAC 
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Table 4-5  Continued 
 
Certain “0” Outcomes 
Model 1 
 
depfed*TOTALECO*PACFUND*REGLOBBY*HIREDGUN*NUMPAC  + 
depfed*totaleco*interdep*pacfund*reglobby*hiredgun  + 
DEPFED*TOTALECO*INTERDEP*pacfund*REGLOBBY*HIREDGUN*numpac  + 
DEPFED*totaleco*interdep*pacfund*REGLOBBY*HIREDGUN*NUMPAC  + 
DEPFED*totaleco*interdep*pacfund*REGLOBBY*hiredgun*numpac  + 
depfed*TOTALECO*INTERDEP*pacfund*reglobby*hiredgun*numpac 
 
Model 3 
 
depfed*totaleco*interdep*pacfund*reglobby*hiredgun  + 
DEPFED*totaleco*interdep*pacfund*REGLOBBY*HIREDGUN*NUMPAC  + 
DEPFED*totaleco*interdep*pacfund*REGLOBBY*hiredgun*numpac  + 
depfed*TOTALECO*INTERDEP*pacfund*reglobby*hiredgun*numpac 
 
  
Positive Outcomes 
The minimized causal sets leading to a positive outcome on TAXCHANGE includes:39: 
Dti PRH  (Auto, Aerospace, Drugs) 
DTI PRH N  (Oil&Gas, Chemical) 
dtI PRH n  (Diversified Financial) 
Simplified:  PRH (DTI +DTIN + dtIn) 
 
DtI prh N  (General Manufacturing) 
DTi prh N  (Fabricated Metal) 
Simplified:  DprhN (tI + ti) 
 
A clear pattern of relationships emerges from this combination of variables.  Six out of eight 
cases are represented by strong direct political behaviors (PACFUND, REGLOBBY, and 
HIREDGUN - PRH) and a strong relationship with the state (D). When grouped in this manner it 
is easy to see the inherent similarities between the cases.  The first set is characterized by very 
strong-targeted political behaviors, in addition to having either a strong Federal (State) 
relationship, and weak economic position and weak inter-industry dependence (DtiPRH).  The 
 
                                                     
39 The notation used in these causal sets represents the first letter for each of the independent variables.  A 
capital letter represents the high presence of a condition, while a lower case notation indicates the low presence of a 
condition. 
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second set is characterized by a strong Federal relationship, and both a strong total economic 
position and a strong inter-industry connection (DTIPRHN).  In these first two sets, five of the 
eight winning industries are represented.  A positive outcome would naturally be expected when 
all of the variables are strong. 
Diversified financials are a somewhat special industry in this analysis because they are 
the only industry that does not manufacture a product.  Their pattern of success could be 
representative of a different kind of relationship.  The causal set associated with this industry has 
a weak Federal relationship, weak total economic position, but a strong level of industry-
interconnections, and a strong directed political activity score (dtIPRHn).    
The third group of causal sets has a strong Federal relationship, and either a strong total 
economic position or a strong level of inter-industry connections, but a low level of directed 
political activity score with a high general political activity score DTi or DtIprhN.  The 
industries, fabricated metals and general manufacturing, represent two cases in which 
PACFUND, REGLOBBY and HIREDGUN are low, but still achieve a positive outcome 
(TAXCHANGE).  The causal sets associated with these two industries are represented by a 
strong economic position, or inter-industry dependency and a strong Federal relationship, low 
directed political behavior while the general political involvement of a high number of PACs 
exists.  This presents a different political scenario that the majority of winning cases.  Although 
not included in the analysis, another explanation for their success might lie in their political 
representation by industry associations.  These two industries had strong industry association 
lobby efforts being conducted by the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of 
Commerce, the Business Round Table, and the Business Industry Political Action Committee, 
not to mention a series of key lobbyists such as Charls Walker & Associates who headed the 
“Carlton Group” (a specialized tax lobby).  It could be the case that industry associations 
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exercised the political influence for these industry segments, which was not a part of the data 
collected for this analysis.  Even so, as stated above, these two industries did produced a unique 
causal set, represented by the following statement:  TAXCHANGE = phrN (DtI+Dti).  Positive 
outcomes are associated with a careful mix of economic and political variables; when the 
targeted political behavior variables were low then the industry had to have a high number of 
PACs and a strong Federal relationship in addition to either a strong economic position or a high 
number of inter-industry connections.  All of the “winning industries have unique sets compared 
to the “losing” industries. 
 
Negative Outcomes 
The causal pattern for unsuccessful “0” outcomes is also clear.  In every case, failure was 
associated with a low score on pacfund.  The four causal sets for “0” outcomes fail to have  
dtiprh   
DtipRHN 
DtipRhn 
DTIprhn 
Simplified:  p(dtirh)(DtiRHN)(DtiRHn)(dTIrhn) 
 
economic or political strength:  In particular, the missing element in each of the cases is 
campaign funding (pacfund).  As is evident, even all other political behaviors are strong, the 
“losing” industries lack sufficient economic strength or inter-industry connections to overcome 
the lack of political engagement.  While the “losing” or some might say non-winning industries 
also have a mix of economic and political characteristics, the most prominent set is all weak 
scores which results in a negative outcome.  It is also worth noting, that an industry could be 
strong on all three economic variables, but weak on all political variables and still lose.   
 The “loser” industry models help to clarify the conditions associated with a weak or 
negative tax outcome, which contrary to most regression analysis, negative outcome in this case 
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is a failure to decrease effective tax rate.40  Failure to contribute to the members of the House 
Ways and Means, and Senate Finance Committees in conjunction with weak economic 
conditions resulted in low change in effective tax rate.  In addition, four of the six causal sets 
scored low on economic dependence (totaleco) and inter-industry dependence (interdep).  These 
cannot be determined “necessary conditions” however because they also appear in “winning” 
cases, although in different causal set combinations this may account for the difference of 
political activity. 
 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981  
The passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 marked a significant and dramatic shift 
for tax policy in the United States.  A long battle waged by key industry representatives and 
corporate giants paid off with the largest tax reduction package in the history of the country.  
Changes in the tax code included the radical accelerated depreciation schedules, investment tax 
credits, a 25 percent reduction in tax credits for research and development, tax credits for older 
structures, diminished tax rates for windfall oil profits, and the short lived (but much abused) 
provision of safe-harbor leasing.41 
Accelerated depreciation was a major issue for the business lobbyists.  Early on, the 
basis of the tax reduction was to limit the marginal rate (a provision that would not be furthered 
 
                                                     
40 In regression analysis, a negative effect means that while the independent variable increases, the dependent 
variable of tax decreases.  This is expressed as a negative effect.  A negative effect should not be confused with a 
negative outcome. 
41 This is not a complete list of tax changes, but rather represents items of interest to corporate entities.  Safe-
harbor leasing was a practice wherein one company could sell tax credits to another company by arranging for “lease” 
provisions to be transferred from one company to the other.  If a company had more capital investment credits than it 
could use, safe-harbor leasing allowed them to distribute them to other companies.  It is estimated that billions in lost 
tax revenue resulted from this provision.  It was quickly recognized as so abusive that it was repealed in 1982, 
although was not effective until 1984.   
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until the mid-1980’s) and accelerate the rate at which capital investments could be written-off.  
The old system relied on the life of the goods approach, and the business community felt that it 
tied up too much capital.  Their rational was that the write-off was inevitable, why not speed up 
the process and inject much needed capital into the system.  The new accelerated depreciation 
schedule, known as accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) of 3:5:10:15 replaced the old life 
of the good depreciation method (see Appendix A).  The pre-1981 system allowed for property, 
vehicles, equipment and the like to be written-off over the realistic life of the good.  The new 
system dramatically reduced the write-off period, with a dramatic effect on the tax statements for 
those industries poised to take advantage of these new tax provisions.   
 Certain industries clearly benefited from the tax changes.  Other industries however, 
such as electrical, were unable to reap similar benefits.  The electrical industry is comprised of 
firms that vary from small appliances to government contractors.  Many of the government 
contracts were completed during this period (known as completed contract form of accounting), 
causing a minor accounting effect that elevated effective tax rates for the industry.  When a 
government contract is complete, even if completed payment is not complete, the company must 
account for the income.  Although it sounds detrimental, the reality is that before contract 
completion, the firm does not have to claim any of the income on its balance sheets and therefore 
can significantly reduce their income during one period, but most account for it later.  This is the 
case for many of the electrical firms in the sample. 
 
Summary 
The industries that benefited from ERTA81 are clearly identified by both their economic 
position and their political behavior.  While it is easy to claim industry “winners” as those 
industries of greatest importance, this is not the single best indicator of political influence.  In 
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1998, Jerry Jasinowski, then President and CEO of the National Association of Manufacturers, 
reflected on the importance and strength of the manufacturing industry political voice as he 
claimed that the congressional agenda was heavily influenced by NAM because NAM member 
firms represented 85% of the manufacturing output (Jacobs 1998).  The idea that economic 
strength and political effort are synonymous is incorrect.  Power emerges from an interdependent 
relationship between economic position and certain political actions.  Economic strength alone 
did not guarantee or present itself as a “necessary” condition for a positive tax outcome.  The 
business community claims that the policy winners are those industries described by Amitai 
Etzioni  (speaking of developmental economics in response to supply-side trends): 
They seek to identify industries that are future winners and losers in terms of 
providing exports, jobs, and productivity growth.  The winners are to be 
subsidized and otherwise promoted; the losers are to be helped to find a 
“sunset.”  This approach might entail too-detailed reading of the future, and it 
puts too much of a burden on the government, or the yet-to-be formed 
government-business-labor “investment committees.”(Etzioni 1980: 16)   
 
While economic position is important (although not as clearly defined with the employment 
variable) the state does not blindly reward economic performance.  If it did, then retail would be 
a tax “winner” as would the electronics industry, but they are not.  The importance of directed 
political behavior is critical to the success of an industry.  The idea that there exists some form of 
industry hierarchy is neither new or nor startling, however being able to clearly define a model 
of causal conditions is a radical advancement of our understanding of the nature of political 
power. 
 Economic prosperity is not the sole criteria defining political benefit.  Neither does 
political behavior alone produce a model of policy success.  Clearly, industries with economic 
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standing, in concert with direct political activity benefited from the tax policy changes in the 
form of reduced effective tax rates.42  As a side note, not long after the passage of ERTA81, 
press accounts appeared forecasting warnings about supply-side promises (Economist 1982), 
quickly realizing that shifting capital flow to investors did not guarantee increased investment in 
this country. 
 
                                                     
42 Note that the decrease in effective tax rates did not result from a reduction in profitability.  In fact, the overall 
profitability increased from t to t+1.   
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Overview  
In this analysis, a power relationship was uncovered through the introduction of conceptually 
unique measures of economic industry interdependence and directed political behaviors, in the 
comparison of 18 industries change in effective tax rates associated with the passage of the 
Economic Recovery Act of 1981.  A significant set of findings from this analysis identify 
certain, non-contradictory causal sets that combine unique political actions and economic 
conditions with positive tax outcomes in a manner that has not been demonstrated in the past.  
Industries that were able to successfully reduce their effective tax rates by five percent or more, 
had in common a set of related causal conditions that are both politically strong and connected to 
the economic structure in a particular manner.  The identification of these unique causal sets 
provides a clearer explanation for the relationship between variables and outcomes, and evidence 
that our current theoretical models are inadequate to address the complexity of the relationships 
evidenced by winning industries. 
 Previous studies have failed to identify a consistent causal mechanism of political power 
because the relationships are more complex than a linear model can effectively communicate.  
This study demonstrates the existence of a pattern of relationships between economic and 
political variables that supports the finding that under certain conditions, industries are able to 
affect change in tax policy in a way that allows them to ultimately reduce effective tax levels.  
This interaction of variables establishes a clear pattern and a tangible model of intra-industry 
segmented power.  For the first time, a clear empirical picture emerges regarding the varied and 
complex relationships that exist between industry and State relations.  On their own, neither 
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political nor economic variables were able to provide a clear explanation of events, both 
suffering from major contradictions.  The presence of such strong contradictions leads to the 
conclusion that the theoretical explanations associated with the exclusive variable models 
(political and economic) are unable to explain industry power.   
 The dominant causal sets associated with a positive outcome are three closely related 
patterns (causal sets) of directed political behavior (PAC contributions, registered lobbyists and 
hired guns) with a distinct combination of economic conditions.  The first set is the combination 
of directed political activity (PAC contributions, registered lobbyists and outside lobby firms) 
and the presence of a strong Federal-industry relationship and a mix of either total economic 
strength or a strong level of inter-industry connectivity (or both) resulted in a positive outcome 
for five of the eight “winning” industries.  The only difference between the two dominant causal 
sets is that one has a strong total economic measure and the other has a strong number of 
industry interconnections.43  The other two types of causal sets are far less frequent.  Diversified 
financials represent a causal set wherein a positive outcome was achieved with the same directed 
political activity as above, but in this case the economic conditions were marked by a low score 
on total economic position and a low score on Federal-industry relationship, while the number of 
inter-industry connections was strong.  The last type of causal set was associated with a strong 
Federal relationship and a strong score on either total economic condition or number of inter-
industry relationships in combination with a strong general political strategy of a larger number 
of PACs for the industry.   
 
                                                     
43 The “six winning industries” discussed are oil& gas, diversified financials, aerospace, chemical, automotive, 
and drugs.  The two other winning industries are discussed in footnote above. 
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 A low score for all economic and political variables clearly led to failure.  A negative 
outcome was also associated with a mix of high and low scores on both political and economic 
variables with one exception.  Negative outcomes were associated with causal sets having low 
scores on PACFUND.  An industry, strong on all other political measures, but weak on PAC 
contributions still resulted in a negative outcome.  However, a high level of PAC contributions 
does not insure a positive outcome.  In order to achieve a positive certain outcome PACFUND 
had to be associated with a number of other political and economic conditions.  Of equal 
importance was the case of failure.  In all cases, industries that failed to achieve the tax outcome, 
scored low on PAC funding.  Overall, industries that did not have the particular causal sets 
discussed above, resulted in the failure to effectively reduce industry tax burden.44  Findings 
from this study support an integrated theoretical model that necessitates the combination and 
interaction of both economic and political explanatory factors in the explaining industry-state 
power relations.   
 
Implications for Future Theory and Analysis 
Theoretical implications resulting from this research lead to support for the development of a 
more integrated and contingent model of industry political power.  Contrary to both class 
dominance and structuralist explanations, my findings did not support either of the theoretically 
exclusive structural economic or the political dominance models.  While counter to these 
theoretical models, my research is consistent with quantitative research findings that have not 
been able to effectively link political behavior alone with policy outcomes (or voting behavior), 
 
                                                     
44 This is assuming that the industries GENMAN and FABMETAL are recoded or removed from the analysis 
because of their limited number of occurrences.  More likely, these two industries are misspecified due to their heavy 
involvement with industry association representatives such as NAM and BIPAC. 
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or support the concept of a unified class effect.  Similarly, my study fails to identify a solely 
economic explanation for reduced tax rates resulting from tax policy change.  The most 
important and therefore significant conclusion drawn from this study is support for the existence 
and identification of a segmented capitalists class demarcated by industry or an intra-industry 
segmented class.  No class-wide benefit emerged in the sample.  Distinct political and economic 
combinations separated the tax avoiders or “winners” from the non-tax avoiders as associated 
with distinct industries.   
 Use of Boolean logic and qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin 1987) provides a 
methodological departure from past research that has heavily relied on qualitative case studies 
and linear regression analysis.  The power of QCA, lies in the ability to present multiple casual 
conditions, alone or in combination, that provide an explanation for the varied conditions within 
which successful outcomes are achieved.  Lifting the limitations of a single model to the 
possibility that different explanations exist for the similar outcomes, streamlines the 
understanding of the causal conditions into manageable and understandable sets.   
 In this case, a single model could not capture the causal conditions associated with 
decreasing industry effective tax rates.  The causally complex and multi-leveled series of 
interactions that exist between industry economic strength and political engagement is riddled 
with highly correlated measures of political behavior that in a statistical analysis would fail due 
to problems of multicollinearity.  Yet, this analysis provides evidence that it is this precise 
combination of political behaviors and specific economic conditions that leads to a successful 
outcome.  Although the methodological approach cannot provide statistical support for these 
casual conditions, it dramatically improves the basis from which we can evaluate the effect of 
political and economic factors as they affect tax policy outcome.  
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Limitations of the Study  
A number of limitations are associated with this analysis.  First, a larger sample (both in terms of 
number of firms per industry and number of industries) would strengthen this analysis.  Missing 
data eliminated both a large number of firms and entire industries from the sample set.  The 
inclusion of a larger sample would increase the validity of the results and allow for a comparison 
of findings with regression techniques.  Second, variable thresholds (determining the high and 
low categories) were set established primarily by mean values and data break points.  Most 
measures fell short of the 95 percent confidence interval.  Although not as serious a problem 
when using QCA, as would be the case in regression analysis, it still leaves some question as to 
the appropriateness of the established breakpoints for each measure.  Third, this analysis is 
limited to those industries associated with the 1981 Fortune listing of largest industries.  
Therefore, the findings are limited to a discussion for the largest industry representatives and not 
the total industry or all industries.  Fourth, missing data and the elimination of primary metals, 
commercial banking, and insurance also leaves the question as to whether their presence would 
have altered the threshold values of the measures evaluated.45  While different thresholds could 
yield vastly different results, the interesting thing is that the thresholds established (often low 
thresholds) have an impact on the outcome.  Fifth, the use of corporate level data for an industry 
analysis may be problematic.  Although the intent was to examine the industries using the largest 
firms, the ability to generalize past the largest corporate representatives of an industry is limited. 
 
                                                     
45 Only commercial banking and insurance could have negatively affected the development of the measures.  
Primary metal was included in the development of the measures as was not eliminated until it was clear that it had 
failed to make a profit in the years following the passage of ERTA81.   
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Recommendations for Future Research 
In the course of developing this project, it became clear early on that this would be but the first 
of many tax policy evaluations.  Since the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the U.S. 
Congress has passed several more industry friendly legislative initiatives.  Each of the 
subsequent pieces of legislation needs to be investigated to determine whether the winning 
causal conditions found in relation to the 1981 tax act are stable throughout time, or whether the 
specific relationships are contingent and varying.   
 Second, this model should be tested using different policy content to determine whether 
the causal sets are policy specific or whether broader policy networks exist.  When Glasberg and 
Skidmore (1997) found that banking interests did not have to contribute PAC dollars to members 
of the banking committees to gain favorable results, they established an important element for 
work like my own.  When congressional committees have a natural constituency, as found in the 
case of banking committees, they may respond differently than committees that have a more 
global mandate.   
 Third, the use of many different policy outcomes (as defined in my work as the 
implementation of a policy) as the dependent variable would add to our overall understanding of 
the varying nature of political/economic power.   
Fourth, future studies should include a measure of industry association impact.  The 
important role played by multi-industry associations is apparent when considering the role that 
the National Association of Manufacturers, the Association of Chemical Manufacturers, and the 
American Banking Association.  Although not included in this study, the political involvement 
of these associations was, and continues to be, important to the establishment of political 
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power.46  Another measure that would be useful to evaluate would be grassroots lobbying efforts.  
The qualitative literature indicates grassroots behavior to have had a significant impact on the 
perceived support for tax reduction legislation.  Grassroots efforts are often organized by 
industry sponsored events, and used to defend the necessity of tax reform.  Including a measure 
of grassroots actions would reduce the possibility of missing important (influential) political 
behavior as an independent variable.   
 Fifth, conducting firm-level analysis could prove informative and a basis for comparison 
with industry-level data analysis.  A firm-level analysis would provide the opportunity which to 
apply statistical techniques in addition to the Boolean logic, as well as provide an opportunity to 
introduce firm level variables into the analysis (e.g., product diversity, organizational form).   
Sixth, an in-depth historical analysis of the industries associated with both winning and 
losing status would be informative.  This type of analysis could provide additional measures that 
might be missing currently from the overall model.   
 
Conclusions 
This study clearly departs from the existing literature on state-industry power relations.  Using a 
qualitative approach based on logic, the emergent casual sets support a theoretical power model 
based on intra-industry class segmentation and the integration of political and economic 
explanatory variables.  The introduction of new measures assisted in understanding the complex 
economic and political relationships between industry-state (Federal Government) that result in 
positive tax policy outcomes.  Findings from this study call for the refinement of current 
theories, supporting a move toward a more middle-range contingent theoretical approach guided 
 
                                                     
46 Industry political behaviors were limited to firm specific involvement and not a total industry measure.   
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by grand theory but not limited by exclusive causal conditions.  In the case of the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the 18 industries examined in this study, power-base is not an 
economic or political strength alone, but a combination of both.  The causal conditions 
associated with industry power (as demonstrated by a certain positive tax outcome) emerged in 
the form of a clearly identifiable set of causal conditions, refuting existing models, findings and 
theory.  
 This study provides explicit models for industry political success.  Successful industries 
were able to benefit from their participation with the state.  The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 provided specific provisions that benefited some, not all industries.  This finding directly 
contradicts any notion of free-riders (Olson 1965) within the economic elite firms used for this 
sample.  Theoretical development must address the type of industry, the type of firms within 
industry (as in this case industries evaluated were made up of the largest firms within the 
industry), and the context within which policy is being affected.  Certainly, it could be expected 
that oligopolistic industries will behave differently than more competitive industry segments 
 The findings and approach used in this study, represent a departure from earlier research 
in this area, and suggest that current theories are inadequately conceptualized and unable to fully 
address the complex and dynamic nature of industry – state power relations.  This study provides 
a new framework from which to further the discussion of the interdependency of economic 
conditions and political action in relation to legislative benefit and state relations.  
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE A-1.  MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 1981 
 
 
Depreciation Period 
 
Applicable Property 
 
3-Year 
(ADR of 4 years of less) 
 
Section 1245 property – tangible personal property. 
 
Tangible property with a class life of four years or less, including vehicles (cars, 
light trucks) and some machinery. 
 
Assets used in research and development. 
 
5-Year 
(ADR of 4.5 to 18 years) 
 
Section 1245 property not included in the 3,5, or 15 year classes.  Includes most 
machinery, equipment and furniture. 
 
Single purpose agricultural and horticultural buildings. 
 
Property (not buildings) used in the manufacturing process, mining, 
communications or transportation.   
 
10-Year (ADR of greater than 
25 years) 
 
Public Utility Property (with asset depreciation range (ADR) midpoint life 
greater than 18 but not greater than 25 years). 
 
Certain coal-fired boilers and burners. 
 
Railroad Tank Cars. 
 
Some residential mobile homes. 
 
Section 1250 property, with ADR midpoint life that is less than 12.5 years.   
 
15-Year 
Real Property 
 
Section 1250 property not falling in the 10-year range. 
 
15-Year 
Public Utility 
Section 1245 public utility property with a current class life of more than 25 
years, including:  electric utility steam production plants, gas utility 
manufactured gas product plants, water utility property, and telephone 
distribution plants. 
 
 
(Source:  Drawn directly from the AMA Property Management summary of the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax 
Act.) 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLE B-1.  1981 FORTUNE 500 AND 300 FIRMS 
COID Company Name 
Final Set 
 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
20 United Technologies x aerospace 
31 Boeing Co. x aerospace 
45 McDonnell Douglas Corp. x aerospace 
48 Rockwell International x aerospace 
57 Lockheed x aerospace 
130 Martin Marietta x aerospace 
149 Kidde x aerospace 
194 Northrop x aerospace 
262 Fairchild Industries x aerospace 
302 Cessna Aircraft x aerospace 
305 Sundstrand x aerospace 
361 Bangor Punta x aerospace 
444 Gates Learjet x aerospace 
452 Rohr Industries x aerospace 
76 General Dynamics d aerospace 
203 Grumman d aerospace 
3 General Motors Corp. x auto 
6 Ford Motor Co. x auto 
26 Chrysler x auto 
71 TRW x auto 
86 Bendix x auto 
139 Eaton x auto 
158 Dana x auto 
162 American Motors x auto 
165 American Standard x auto 
216 PACCAR x auto 
243 Evans Products x auto 
245 AMF x auto 
278 GATX x auto 
321 ACF Industries x auto 
347 Federal-Mogul x auto 
366 A.O. Smith x auto 
426 Todd Shipyards x auto 
466 Sheller-Globe x auto 
476 Arvin Industries x auto 
46 International Harvester d auto 
70 Signal Companies d auto 
174 Ogden d auto 
183 Fruehauf d auto 
380 Trinity Industries d auto 
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Table B-1 Continued   
COID Company Name 
Final Set 
 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
12 Du Pont (E.I.) de Nemours x chemical 
24 Dow Chemical Co. x chemical 
30 Union Carbide x chemical 
53 W. R. Grace x chemical 
106 American Cyanamid x chemical 
122 PPG Industries x chemical 
193 Olin x chemical 
201 SCM x chemical 
206 Rohm & Haas x chemical 
214 Ethyl x chemical 
217 Stauffer Chemical x chemical 
228 Air Products & Chemicals x chemical 
231 Sherwin-Williams x chemical 
280 Pennwalt x chemical 
320 Reichhold Chemicals x chemical 
346 Freeport-McMoRan x chemical 
351 Big Three Industries x chemical 
367 Vulcan Materials x chemical 
384 Dow Corning x chemical 
389 Clorox x chemical 
392 Ferro x chemical 
398 Insilco x chemical 
407 Nalco Chemical x chemical 
462 Savannah Foods &Industries x chemical 
50 Monsanto d chemical 
55 Allied d chemical 
104 Celanese d chemical 
156 NL Industries d chemical 
157 Hercules d chemical 
190 Koppers d chemical 
196 International Minerals & Chemical d chemical 
198 Williams Companies d chemical 
218 National Distillers & Chemical d chemical 
225 American Hoechst d chemical 
282 Airco d chemical 
303 CF Industries d chemical 
307 BASF Wyandotte d chemical 
318 Morton-Norwich Products d chemical 
337 Lubrizol d chemical 
383 Thiokol d chemical 
405 National Starch & Chemical d Chemical 
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COID Company Name 
Final Set 
 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
434 Sun Chemical d chemical 
463 Dexter d chemical 
477 Mallinckrodt d chemical 
601 Federal National Mortgage Assn.  x dfin 
603 American Express (New York) x dfin 
605 Merrill Lynch (New York) x dfin 
609 First Boston x dfin 
610 Loews Corporation (New York) x dfin 
613 Transamerica x dfin 
618 Beneficial (Wilmington) x dfin 
620 Avco Corp. (Greenwich, Conn.) x dfin 
622 E.F. Hutton Group (New York) x dfin 
625 Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette  x dfin 
635 Alleghany Corp. (New York) x dfin 
638 Paine Webber (New York) x dfin 
602 Aetna Life & Casualty d dfin 
604 Travelers Corp. d dfin 
606 H.F. Ahmanson  d dfin 
607 INA  d dfin 
608 Great Western Financial  d dfin 
611 First Charter Financial  d dfin 
612 Lincoln National d dfin 
614 Imperial Corp. of America d dfin 
615 American General  d dfin 
616 Continental  d dfin 
617 American International Group  d dfin 
619 Walter E. Heller International  d dfin 
621 Household Finance Corp. d dfin 
623 Golden West Financial  d dfin 
624 Baldwin-United  d dfin 
626 
Gibraltar Financial Corp. of 
California d dfin 
627 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty d dfin 
628 St. Paul Cos.  d dfin 
629 Bache Group  d dfin 
630 General Reinsurance  d dfin 
631 Crum & Forster  d dfin 
632 Financial Corp. of America  d dfin 
633 American Financial  d dfin 
634 Kemper  d dfin 
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Table B-1 Continued    
COID Company Name 
Final Set 
 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
636 Capital Holding  d dfin 
637 City Federal Savings & Loan Assn.  d dfin 
639 Chubb  d dfin 
640 SAFECO  d dfin 
641 Reliance Group  d dfin 
642 Financial Federation  d dfin 
643 American Savings  d dfin 
644 
American Savings & Loan Assn.  Of 
Florida d dfin 
645 Western Financial d dfin 
646 TRANSOHIO Financial Corp.  d dfin 
647 Financial Corp. of Santa Barbara  d dfin 
648 Northern California Savings & Loan d dfin 
649 Broadview Financial  d dfin 
650 Guarantee Financial Corp. of Calif. d dfin 
68 Johnson & Johnson x drugs 
113 Bristol-Meyers x drugs 
119 Warner-Lambert x drugs 
145 Merck x drugs 
154 Eli Lilly x drugs 
160 Avon Products x drugs 
171 Revlon x drugs 
172 Abbott Laboratories x drugs 
205 Upjohn x drugs 
210 Schering-Plough x drugs 
211 Sterling Drug x drugs 
236 Chesebrough-Pond's x drugs 
500 Shaklee x drugs 
25 Proctor & Gamble d drugs 
72 Colgate-Palmolive d drugs 
93 American Home Products d drugs 
133 Pfizer d drugs 
195 Smithkline d drugs 
207 Squibb d drugs 
239 Baxter Travenol Laboratories d drugs 
268 Richardson-Vicks d drugs 
281 Lever Brothers d drugs 
304 G.D. Searle d drugs 
372 Miles Laboratories d drugs 
396 Purex Industries d drugs 
421 Economics Laboratory  d drugs 
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Table B-1 Continued    
COID Company Name 
Final Set 
 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
11 General Electric x electrical 
34 Westinghouse x electrical 
44 RCA x electrical 
62 Raytheon x electrical 
79 Litton Industries x electrical 
118 Emerson Electric x electrical 
126 Motorola x electrical 
135 Warner Communications x electrical 
150 Singer x electrical 
166 Whirlpool x electrical 
179 Gould x electrical 
184 White Consolidated Industries x electrical 
237 Sunbeam x electrical 
274 AMP x electrical 
287 National Semiconductor x electrical 
289 Square D x electrical 
291 Johnson Controls x electrical 
331 Scovill x electrical 
349 General Instruments x electrical 
354 Champion Spark Plug x electrical 
363 Intel x electrical 
376 Hoover x electrical 
402 Magic Chef x electrical 
461 Raychem x electrical 
468 Oak Industries x electrical 
14 
International Telephone & 
Telegraph d electrical 
22 Western Electric d electrical 
91 Texas Instruments d electrical 
131 North American Philips d electrical 
204 Allegheny International d electrical 
229 Harris d electrical 
266 Avnet  d electrical 
269 Zenith Radio d electrical 
343 National Service Industries d electrical 
400 Varlan Associates d electrical 
464 M/A Com d electrical 
74 Continental Group x fab metals 
124 Textron x fab metals 
173 Gillette x fab metals 
220 Foster Wheeler x fab metals 
221 Whittaker x fab metals 
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COID Company Name 
Final Set 
 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
233 National Can x fab metals 
253 Chromalloy American x fab metals 
257 Crown Cork & Seal x fab metals 
286 Harsco x fab metals 
295 Parker-Hannifin x fab metals 
315 Stanley Works x fab metals 
338 Masco x fab metals 
413 H.H. Robertson x fab metals 
427 Wyman-Gordon x fab metals 
493 Ampco-Pittsburgh x fab metals 
494 Barnes Group x fab metals 
497 Ceco x fab metals 
498 Illinois Tool Works x fab metals 
61 Gulf & Western Industries d fab metals 
81 American Can d fab metals 
108 McDermott d fab metals 
326 CBI Industries d fab metals 
358 Ball  d fab metals 
394 Signode d fab metals 
428 Wallace Murray d fab metals 
445 Hoover Universal d fab metals 
41 Beatrice Foods x food & bev 
43 Philip Morris x food & bev 
49 Pepsico x food & bev 
52 General Foods x food & bev 
58 Coca-Cola x food & bev 
60 Nabisco Brands x food & bev 
73 Ralston Purina x food & bev 
80 General Mills x food & bev 
85 Borden x food & bev 
89 CPC International x food & bev 
96 American Brands x food & bev 
99 Anheuser-Busch x food & bev 
107 Archer-Daniels-Midland x food & bev 
121 Carnation x food & bev 
127 Esmark x food & bev 
129 Pillsbury x food & bev 
141 Norton Simon x food & bev 
153 Campbell Soup x food & bev 
161 Quaker Oats x food & bev 
175 Kellogg x food & bev 
197 Amstar x food & bev 
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COID Company Name 
Final Set 
 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
199 Central Soya x food & bev 
202 Anderson Clayton x food & bev 
247 Geo. A. Hormel x food & bev 
298 International Multifoods x food & bev 
323 Adolph Coors x food & bev 
355 Monfort of Colorado x food & bev 
360 G. Heileman Brewing x food & bev 
382 Dean Foods x food & bev 
397 Pabst Brewing x food & bev 
408 McCormick x food & bev 
419 Gerber Products x food & bev 
429 Wm. Wrigley Jr. x food & bev 
436 Idle Wild Foods x food & bev 
443 Stokely-Van Camp x food & bev 
471 Tyson Foods x food & bev 
472 Brown-Forman Distillers x food & bev 
491 Rath Packing x food & bev 
29 Dart & Kraft d food & bev 
32 Reynolds (R.J.) Industries d food & bev 
63 Consolidated Foods d food & bev 
82 Greyhound d food & bev 
90 BATUS d food & bev 
92 IC Industries d food & bev 
95 United Brands d food & bev 
111 H.J. Heinz d food & bev 
115 Land 0'Lakes d food & bev 
192 A.E. Staley Manufacturing d food & bev 
212 Gold Kist d food & bev 
227 Heublin d food & bev 
238 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons d food & bev 
244 Hershey Foods d food & bev 
255 ConAgra d food & bev 
270 Campbell Taggart d food & bev 
283 Mid-America Dairymen d food & bev 
296 Federal Co. d food & bev 
306 Universal Leaf Tobacco d food & bev 
335 Jos. Schlitz Brewing d food & bev 
340 Thomas J. Lipton d food & bev 
350 General Cinema d food & bev 
352 Peavey d food & bev 
399 DPF d food & bev 
401 Kane-Miller d food & bev 
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COID Company Name 
Final Set 
 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
451 American Bakeries  d food & bev 
490 Frederick & Herrud d food & bev 
496 Knudsen d food & bev 
37 Caterpillar x general manufacturing 
65 Deere  x general manufacturing 
102 Combustion Engineering x general manufacturing 
109 FMC x general manufacturing 
120 Ingersoll-Rand x general manufacturing 
142 Cooper Industries x general manufacturing 
155 Borg-Warner x general manufacturing 
188 Allis-Chaimers x general manufacturing 
200 Cummins Engine x general manufacturing 
213 Hughes Tool x general manufacturing 
215 Emhart x general manufacturing 
248 Black & Decker Manufacturing x general manufacturing 
250 Timken x general manufacturing 
259 Clark Equipment x general manufacturing 
260 Brunswick x general manufacturing 
290 Rexnord x general manufacturing 
292 Ex-Cell-O x general manufacturing 
311 Dover x general manufacturing 
322 Cincinnati Milacron x general manufacturing 
324 Cameron Iron Works x general manufacturing 
330 Mattel x general manufacturing 
332 Midland-Ross x general manufacturing 
339 Bally Manufacturing x general manufacturing 
356 Tecumseh Products x general manufacturing 
362 Outboard Marine x general manufacturing 
371 Figgie International x general manufacturing 
412 Harnischfeger Industries x general manufacturing 
415 Mohasco x general manufacturing 
422 Eagle-Picher Industries x general manufacturing 
442 Briggs & Stratton x general manufacturing 
449 Peabody International x general manufacturing 
134 Teledyne d general manufacturing 
185 Baker International d general manufacturing 
209 Wheelabrator-Frye d general manufacturing 
285 U.S. Industries d general manufacturing 
297 Joy Manufacturing d general manufacturing 
359 Trane d general manufacturing 
409 Scott & Fetzer d general manufacturing 
420 Hyster d general manufacturing 
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 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
437 American Hoist & Derrick d general manufacturing 
458 L.B. Foster d general manufacturing 
473 Flat-Allis d general manufacturing 
475 Bucyrus-Erie d general manufacturing 
482 Chicago Pneumatic Tool d general manufacturing 
485 Enviortech d general manufacturing 
492 Research-Cottrell d general manufacturing 
8 IBM x measurement 
28 Eastman Kodak Co. x measurement 
42 Xerox x measurement 
54 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing x measurement 
66 Sperry x measurement 
110 Hewlett-Packard x measurement 
116 NCR x measurement 
137 Digital Equipment x measurement 
219 General Signal x measurement 
235 Lear Siegler x measurement 
251 Polaroid x measurement 
252 Pitney Bowes  x measurement 
300 Becton Dickinson x measurement 
301 Tektronix x measurement 
325 Storage Technology x measurement 
341 Wang Laboratories x measurement 
365 Sybron x measurement 
391 EG&G x measurement 
393 Bell & Howell x measurement 
430 Foxboro x measurement 
433 Bausch & Lomb x measurement 
69 Honeywell d measurement 
128 Burroughs d measurement 
144 Control Data d measurement 
293 Perkin-Elmer d measurement 
379 Data General d measurement 
381 Geosources d measurement 
423 Beckman Instruments d measurement 
2 Mobil Corp. x oil & gas 
4 Texaco x oil & gas 
5 Chevron Corp.  x oil & gas 
10 Atlantic Richfield x oil & gas 
13 Shell Oil x oil & gas 
15 Phillips Petroleum x oil & gas 
16 Tenneco x oil & gas 
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 x = in final; 
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18 Occidental Petroleum x oil & gas 
23 Getty Oil x oil & gas 
33 Amerada Hess x oil & gas 
39 Cities Services x oil & gas 
56 Union Pacific x oil & gas 
59 Coastal x oil & gas 
83 Dresser Industries  x oil & gas 
100 Agway x oil & gas 
101 Kerr-McGee x oil & gas 
117 Tosco x oil & gas 
164 American Petrofina x oil & gas 
167 Murphy Oil x oil & gas 
182 MAPCO x oil & gas 
187 Superior Oil x oil & gas 
242 Crown Central Petroleum x oil & gas 
267 Witco Chemical x oil & gas 
273 Louisiana Land & Exploration x oil & gas 
277 Smith International x oil & gas 
299 Pacific Resources x oil & gas 
327 Quaker State Oil Refining x oil & gas 
390 Dorchester Gas x oil & gas 
403 GAF x oil & gas 
1 Exxon d oil & gas 
7 Standard Oil (California) d oil & gas 
9 Gulf Oil (Pittsburgh) d oil & gas 
17 Sun Co. d oil & gas 
21 Standard Oil INDIANA d oil & gas 
27 Union Oil of California d oil & gas 
35 Ashland Oil d oil & gas 
36 Marathon Oil d oil & gas 
64 Farmland Industries d oil & gas 
75 Charter d oil & gas 
112 Diamond Shamrock d oil & gas 
123 Penn Central  d oil & gas 
159 Pennzoil d oil & gas 
232 Natomas d oil & gas 
265 Farmers Union central Exchange d oil & gas 
314 Commonwealth Oil Refining d oil & gas 
374 
National Cooperative Refinery 
Assoc.  d oil & gas 
377 Moore McCormack Resources d oil & gas 
395 Mitchell Energy & Development d oil & gas 
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COID Company Name 
Final Set 
 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
467 Midland Cooperatives d oil & gas 
480 Westmoreland Coal d oil & gas 
484 Belco Petroleum d oil & gas 
495 Marion d oil & gas 
67 Georgia-Pacific x paper 
77 International Paper x paper 
84 Weyerhaeuser x paper 
97 Champion International x paper 
140 Crown Zellerbach x paper 
143 Boise Cascade x paper 
146 Mead x paper 
147 Kimberly-Clark x paper 
151 St. Regis Paper x paper 
176 Scott Paper  x paper 
191 Jim Walter x paper 
222 Union Camp x paper 
230 Westvaco x paper 
240 Great Northern Nekoosa x paper 
254 Hammermill Paper x paper 
316 Willamette Industries x paper 
336 Potlatch x paper 
369 Southwest Forest Industries x paper 
375 Washington Post x paper 
410 Nashua x paper 
455 Consolidated Papers x paper 
457 Sonoco Products x paper 
465 Federal Paper Board x paper 
486 Fort Howard Paper x paper 
261 Diamond International d paper 
312 Louisiana-Pacific d paper 
342 AM International d paper 
386 Bemis d paper 
388 Saxon Industries d paper 
411 Maryland Cup d paper 
416 Avery International d paper 
441 Dennison Manufacturing d paper 
447 James River Corp. of Virginia d paper 
454 Massonite d paper 
489 Georgia Kraft  d paper 
168 McGraw-Edison x print 
186 Times Mirror x print 
258 Gannett  x print 
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 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
271 R.R. Donnelley & Sons x print 
272 Knight-Ridder Newspapers x print 
294 McGraw-Hill x print 
344 New York Times x print 
414 Dow Jones x print 
453 Harcourt Brace Jovanovich x print 
470 Delux Check Printers x print 
478 American Greetings x print 
487 Macmillan x print 
125 Time Inc. d print 
373 Arcata d print 
438 Capital Cities Communications d print 
801 Sears Roebuck (Chicago) x retail 
802 Safeway Stores (Oakland) x retail 
803 K Mart  x retail 
804 J.C. Penney  x retail 
805 Kroger Co.(Cincinnati) x retail 
807 Lucky Stores (Dublin, Calif) x retail 
809 Federated Department Stores  x retail 
810 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea  x retail 
811 Winn-Dixie (Jacksonville) x retail 
813 Southland (Dallas) x retail 
814 Jewel Companies (Chicago) x retail 
818 Albertsons ((Boise) x retail 
819 May Department Stores x retail 
821 ARA Services (Philadelphia) x retail 
823 Allied Stores (New York) x retail 
825 Associated Dry Goods (New York) x retail 
826 Macy (R.H.) (New York) x retail 
828 McDonald's (Oak Brook, IL) x retail 
829 Rapid-American (New York) x retail 
831 Stop & Shop Companies (Boston) x retail 
835 Jack Eckerd (Clearwater, Fla) x retail 
836 Walgreen (Deerfield, IL) x retail 
837 Tandy (Fort Worth) x retail 
838 Fisher Foods (Bedford Heights, OH) x retail 
839 Giant Foods (Washington, D.C.) x retail 
840 Waldbaum (Central Islip, NY) x retail 
841 Revco D.S. (Twinsburg, OH) x retail 
842 Mercantile Stores (Wilmington, DE) x retail 
843 First Nat'l Supermarkets  x retail 
846 Pneumo (Boston) x retail 
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Final Set 
 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
848 SCOA Industries (Columbus, OH) x retail 
849 Thrifty (Los Angeles) x retail 
850 Service Merchandise (Nashville) x retail 
806 F.W. Woolworth d retail 
808 American Stores d retail 
812 Montgomery Ward  d retail 
815 Household Merchandising d retail 
816 Dayton Hudson  d retail 
817 Grand Union  d retail 
820 Supermarkets General d retail 
822 Carter Hawley Hale Stores d retail 
824 Melville  d retail 
827 Dillon Companies  d retail 
830 Wal-Mart Stores d retail 
832 Marriott Corp. d retail 
833 Sigmore  d retail 
834 Zayre  d retail 
844 Pantry Pride (Food Fair)  d retail 
845 Marshall Fields  d retail 
847 U.S. Shoe  d retail 
98 Owens-Illinois x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
169 Owens-Corning Fiberglass x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
181 Johns Manville x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
226 Corning Glass Works x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
317 National Gypsum x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
319 Anchor Hocking x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
328 Lone Star Industries x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
334 Certainteed x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
479 Kerr Glass Manufacturing x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
483 Ideal Basic Industries x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
38 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
88 Firestone Tire & Rubber x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
138 B.F. Goodrich x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
177 Uniroyal x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
263 Brown Group x rubber, glass, stone, leather 
241 U.S. Gypsum d rubber, glass, stone, leather 
264 Norton Simon d rubber, glass, stone, leather 
275 Libbey-Owens-Ford d rubber, glass, stone, leather 
368 Brockway Glass d rubber, glass, stone, leather 
446 Gifford-Hill d rubber, glass, stone, leather 
163 General Tire & Rubber  d rubber, glass, stone, leather 
364 Dayco d rubber, glass, stone, leather 
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COID Company Name 
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 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
448 Armstrong Rubber d rubber, glass, stone, leather 
456 Dorsey d rubber, glass, stone, leather 
132 Burlington Industries x textiles 
148 Levi Strauss x textiles 
170 Interco x textiles 
189 J.P. Stevens x textiles 
249 Blue Bell x textiles 
276 West Point-Pepperell x textiles 
348 Cluett Peabody x textiles 
387 Genesco x textiles 
404 United Merchants & Manufacturers x textiles 
406 Cone Mills x textiles 
431 Collins & Aikman x textiles 
435 Kellwood x textiles 
460 Fieldcrest Mills x textiles 
474 Palm Beach x textiles 
481 Warnaco x textiles 
499 Riegel Textile x textiles 
256 Armstrong World Industries d textiles 
279 Akzona d textiles 
329 Springs Mills d textiles 
357 Haret Schaffner & Marx d textiles 
378 VF d textiles 
417 Dan River d textiles 
432 M. Lowenstein d textiles 
901 CSX Corp. (Richmond) x trans 
908 Eastern Airlines (Miami) x trans 
913 Northwest Airlines (St. Paul) x trans 
916 Tiger International (Los Angeles) x trans 
917 Republic Airlines (Minneapolis) x trans 
923 Continental Air Lines (Los Angeles) x trans 
924 Western Air Lines (Los Angeles) x trans 
928 Yellow Freight System  x trans 
931 Texas Air (Houston) x trans 
932 Piedmont Aviation (Winston-Salem) x trans 
936 Federal Express (Memphis) x trans 
943 
Arkansas Best (Fort Smith, 
Arkansas) x trans 
944 Alexander & Baldwin (Honolulu) x trans 
948 Kansas City Southern Industries x trans 
902 Trans World Corp.  d trans 
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903 UAL  d trans 
904 Burlington Northern  d trans 
905 United Parcel Service  d trans 
906 American Airlines  d trans 
907 Pan American World Airways d trans 
909 Delta Airlines  d trans 
910 
Santa Fe  Industries (Santa Fe 
South'n Pacific Corp.) d trans 
911 Southern Pacific  d trans 
912 Missouri Pacific Corp.  d trans 
914 Norfolk & Western Ry  d trans 
915 Southern Ry d trans 
918 Sohio Pipe Line  d trans 
919 Braniff International d trans 
920 Consolidated Freightways d trans 
921 Roadway Express d trans 
922 USAIR Group  d trans 
925 Illinois Central Gulf Railroad d trans 
926 Chicago & North Western Transp. d trans 
927 Leaseway Transportation  d trans 
929 Exxon Pipeline d trans 
930 ARCO Pipe Line  d trans 
933 BP Pipelines  d trans 
934 McLean Trucking d trans 
935 Emery Air Freight  d trans 
937 Frontier Airlines  d trans 
938 Telecom Corp. d trans 
939 Allied Van Lines d trans 
940 PSA  d trans 
941 
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & 
Pacific RR  d trans 
942 Rio Grande Industries  d trans 
945 Ozark Airlines d trans 
946 World Airways  d trans 
947 United Van Lines  d trans 
949 Overseas Shipping Group d trans 
950 RLC Corp.  d trans 
1001 AT&T (New York) x utility 
1002 GTE Corp x utility 
1003 Southern Company (Atlanta) x utility 
1005 American Electric Power x utility 
1006 Commonwealth Edison Co.  x utility 
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 x = in final; 
 d = deleted Industry 
1007 
Southern California Edison 
(Rosemead, Calif) x utility 
1009 Consolidated Edison (New York) x utility 
1012 
Virginia Electric & Power 
(Richmond) x utility 
1013 
Consumers Power Co. (Jackson, 
Mich) x utility 
1015 Duke Power Co. (Charlotte) x utility 
1017 
FPL Group (Florida Power and 
Light) (Miami) x utility 
1021 
Carolina Power & Light Co. 
(Raleigh) x utility 
1022 
Central and South West Corp. 
(Dallas) x utility 
1024 
Columbia Gas System (Wilmington, 
DE) x utility 
1025 
Long Island Lighting Co. (Mineola, 
NY) x utility 
1028 
American Natural Resources 
(Detroit) x utility 
1029 Texas Eastern (Houston) x utility 
1033 Northeast Utilities (Berlin, Conn.) x utility 
1037 Cleveland Electric Illuminating ( x utility 
1039 Transco Companies (Houston) x utility 
1040 
Gulf States Utilities Co. (Beaumont, 
TX) x utility 
1042 Baltimore Gas and Electric  x utility 
1046 
Consolidated Natural Gas 
(Pittsburgh) x utility 
1047 Sonat (Birmingham) x utility 
1050 ENSERCH Corp. (Dallas) x utility 
10114 Detroit Edison (Detroit) x utility 
1004 Pacific Gas & Electric  d utility 
1008 Middle South Utilities  d utility 
1010 Texas Utilities Co.  d utility 
1011 PSE&G  d utility 
1016 Philadelphia Electric Co. d utility 
1018 Houston Industries d utility 
1019 General Public Utilities Corp.  d utility 
1020 Pennsylvania Power & Light  d utility 
1023 United Telecommunications  d utility 
1026 Ohio Edison Co.  d utility 
1027 Niagra Mohawk Power  d utility 
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1030 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line d utility 
1031 Union Electric  d utility 
1032 Pacific Power & Light d utility 
1034 Internorth (Northern Natural Gas)   d utility 
1035 El Paso d utility 
1036 Continental Telephone d utility 
1038 Arizona Public Service d utility 
1041 Public Service Co. of Indiana  d utility 
1043 Allegheny Power system d utility 
1044 Northern Indiana PSC d utility 
1045 Northern States Power  d utility 
1048 Illinois Power Co.  d utility 
1049 Pacific Lighting d utility 
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APPENDIX C 
TABLE C-1.  VARIABLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
V
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EP
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* 
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N
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R
EG
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Y
 (r
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) 
H
IR
ED
G
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N
 (r
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io
) 
N
U
M
PA
C
**
 
TA
X
C
H
A
N
G
E 
Stdev 2% 2.0% 4.20 2049 .579 .28 4.15 3.47% 
Mean 3% 3.30% 8.8 3663 1.087 .40 14.29 3.10% 
Confidence 
interval* 
+ or -** 
1% .09% 1.90 946 .275 .13 1.97 1.75% 
Confidence 
Threshold 4% 4.2% 10.7 4610 1.36 .53 16.27 5% 
Threshold 
Used in 
Study 
3% 3.5% 10 4000 1 .40 15 5% 
 
*Controlled for Aerospace, Measurement and Electrical 
**Controlled for Utilities 
***Confidence Interval .05 
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 APPENDIX D 
TABLE D-1.  HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS MEMBERS 1979-1981 
 
 
 
 
House Ways and Means Committee 
Seniority Ordered 
(All eligible for PAC contributions) 
Democratic Members State/position Republican Members State 
Dan Rostenkowski Illinois/Chair 
 
 
Sam Gibbons Florida Barber Conable New York 
J.J. Pickle Texas John J. Duncan Tennessee 
Charles Rangle New York Bill Archer Texas 
Fortney H. “Pete” Stark California Guy Vander Jagt Michigan 
James R. Jones Oklahoma Philip M. Crane Illinois 
Andrew Jacobs Jr. Indiana Bill Frenzel Minnesota 
Harold E. Ford Tennessee James G. Martin North Carolina 
Ken Holland South Carolina L.A. “Skip” Bafalis Florida 
William M. Brodhead Michigan Richard T. Schulze Pennsylvania 
Ed Jenkins Georgia Bill Gradison Ohio 
Richard A. Gephardt Missouri John H. Rousselot California 
Thomas J. Downey New York Henson Moore Louisiana 
Cecil Heftel Hawaii   
Wyche Fowler, Jr. Georgia   
Frank J. Guarini New Jersey   
James M. Shannon Massachusetts   
Marty Russo Illinois   
Don J. Pease Ohio   
Kent Hance Texas   
Robert T. Matsui California   
Don Bailey Pennsylvania   
Vacancy 
 
 
(Source:  Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1981) 
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TABLE D-2.  SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS 1979-1981 
 
Senate Finance Committee 
(Seniority ordered) 
Republican Members State/position Democratic Members State 
Robert Dole Kansas/chair   
Bob Packwood Oregon Russell B. Long Louisiana 
William V. Roth, Jr. Delaware Harry F. Byrd, Jr. Virginia 
John C. Danforth Missouri Lloyd Bentsen Texas 
John H. Chaffee Rhode Island Spark M. Matsunaga Hawaii 
John Heinz Pennsylvania Daniel Patrick Moynihan New York 
Malcolm Wallop Wyoming Max Baucus Montana 
David Durenberger Minnesota David L. Boren Oklahoma 
William L. Armstrong Colorado Bill Bradley New Jersey 
Steven D. Symms Idaho George J. Mitchell Maine 
Charles E. Grassley Iowa  
(Source:  Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1981) 
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